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Introduction
Between the work and friendships of Jacques Martin, Michel Foucault and Louis
Althusser there are moments, images and texts which tempt us to say, ah... 'that's he,'
and furthermore, 'that is his work.' Yet, the textual collaborations of Foucault, Martin
and Althusser can be seen as process of subjectivation, even cannibalism, which blurs the
boundary between self and other. In one of his annual lectures at the College de France,
Foucault asked the question that every good philosopher, adolescent and empty-nester
might ask, by looking at 'Who am I?' in far more elegant terms, as follows:
How was the subject established, at different moments and in different
institutional contexts, as a possible, desirable, or even indispensable
object of knowledge? How were the experience that one may have of
oneself and the knowledge that one forms of oneself organized according
to certain schemes? ... The guiding thread that seems the most useful for
this inquiry is constituted by what one might call the 'techniques of the
self' which is to say, the procedures, which no doubt exist in every
civilization, suggested or prescribed to individuals in order to determine
their identity, maintain it, or transform it in terms of a certain number of
ends, through relations of self-mastery or self-knowledge'.
In outlining a further investigation into these 'techniques of the self Foucault asks:
'What are these 'techniques' which can be used to determine, maintain and transform an
identity?' In the overlapping lives of Louis Althusser, Jacques Martin and Michel
Foucault himself, these questions take on ever increasing complexity. By Foucault's
model, subjectivation, or the process of becoming a subject, is more than the process of
developing a human being. Human being's have biological components; they have dates
of birth and dates of death. The process of 'subjectivation', on the other hand is different:
' Foucault, Michel. "Subjectivity and Truth, " Michel Foucault: Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth. Ed.
Rabinow, Paul. Trans. Robert Hurley, et al. New Press: New York, 1997.
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A process of subjectivation, that is, a production of a mode of existence,
cannot be confused with a subject, unless it is to discharge the latter from
all interiority and even from all identity. Subjectivation does not even
have anything to do with a person': it is an individuation, specific or
collective, that characterizes an event (a time of day, a river, a wind, a
life...) It is an intensive mode and not a personal subject.2
It is the 'intensive modes' of Louis Althusser, Jacques Martin and Michel Foucault, the
techniques by which each man individuates, and the dissolution of these identities in
which I am interested. In the written textual traces of Foucault and Althusser, stories are
told, choices are made, and histories are written. What we find in the literature of and on
each of these three human beings, these male specimens, in fact, are multiple births,
deaths, texts, men, and madness. The 'events' they created, destroyed and left behind
provide nearly infinite ground for nearly infinite possible observations. Where does one
begin, and why should one begin at all?
Let us begin with what we know of the human beings in question. One Louis Althusser
was born October 16th, 1918, at 4:30 in the morning in Bois de Boulogne, 15 kilometers
from Algiers to his mother, Lucienne and his father, Charles Althusser.3 One Jacques
Martin was born to Felix Henri and Marguerite Martin on the 18 th of May, 1922, in Paris,
and one Paul-Michel Foucault came into the world on October 15th, 1926 in Poitiers,
France.4'5 These are the singular, markable beginnings. Yet over time these human
beginnings created an array of selves, some with semblance to three intertwining
biological human beings born on the above dates, and others which developed into
2 This quote originated in the writing of Gilles Deleuze, "La vie comme oeurvre d'art" in Pourparlers, 138
pp 100-101, but :is discussed in an insightful writing by Eleanor Kaufman entitled "Madness and
Repetition" in The Delirium of Praise, p 70.
3 Boutang Moulier, Yann. Louis Althusser. Une Biographie. Grasset: Paris, 1992. p 55.
4 Boutang-Moulier, Yann. Louis Althusser: Une Biographie. Grasset: Paris, 1992. p 453.
5 Macey, David. The Lives of Michel Foucault. Pantheon Books: New York, 1993, p 3.
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dramatically different persons, unions and effects unrecognizable in nuance and in
content.
Beginning with what we know of Jacques Martin, his is a life which has been traced
through the writings, remembrances, lives and ideas of others. Even so, secondary
literature on Martin is scarce, and generally appears only as a subchapter or a footnote on
the life of Althusser. Yet these scant references are critical, as, in the throws of what
Althusser described as an increasingly destructive schizophrenia, Martin destroyed all of
his work before ending his own life in August of 1964. What he left behind included his
passport, a few photos and contracts for German translations which would never be
completed. He also left behind an archive of application files at the Ecole Normale
Superieure in Paris. In the first chapter of my thesis I look through the reference letters,
official documentation and hand written testimonies left behind by Martin as startling
reminders both of his intellectual promise before the onset of schizophrenia and of the
emerging shadows which soon began to blot out that promise.
In the second chapter, I have chosen to play a game with events that are Martin and
Althusser. The game engages the friendship of the two as it challenges notions of
individuality and unique subjecthood. As Deleuze once said of his friend Foucault:
It is not certain that a life, or a work of art, is individuated like a subject,
in fact, to the contrary. Foucault himself, one did not grasp him exactly
like a person. Even on insignificant occasions, when he entered a room, it
was rather like a change of atmosphere, a kind of event, an electric or
magnetic field, or what you will. This did not at all exclude gentleness or
well-being, but it wasn't on the order of the person. It was an ensemble of
intensities.6
6
6 Ibid. p 71
Further exploring the nature of connection through friendship in these 'ensembles of
intensity' mentioned by Deleuze, Derrida looks at cannibalization and perpetual
mourning and finds them at the essence of relationship.
Drawing on Freud's conceptualization of narcissism, Derrida is led to the
formulation: "we are never ourselves, and between us, identical to us, a
'self is never in itself or identical to itself' (Mdmoires 28)... he is led to
the position that we are inevitably cannibal selves...The obvious lack of
self-identity that is seen when the other is mourned in fact pertains in a
more generalized way to every subject constituted with alterity at its heart.
We are the constant interiorization/incorporation of the other. 7
This introduction to Derrida's rich discussion on interiorization and incorporation is also
an introduction to the relationship between Althusser and Jacques Martin introduced in
Chapter 2. In Louis Althusser: Une Biography, Yann Moulier Boutang suggests in
passing that by the end of Althusser's life, and in his autobiographies, Althusser was no
longer writing his own story, but that of Jacques Martin's. Is it possible that in
remembrance, in mourning and in friendship Althusser had so merged Martin with his
own understanding of self, that all distinction between the two had been lost to him? The
idea is at least intriguing, and at most, entirely accurate. Both Althusser and Martin,
while he was alive, tailored their childhood stories to merge with those of the other. Both
grew up with their grandparents, both were absent in their mother's eyes and both had
adverse if not violent relationships with their fathers. In remembrance of his childhood,
Althusser takes on Martin's authentic homosexuality, and by the time Althusser murdered
7 Deutscher, P. "Mourning the Other, Cultural Cannibalism, and the Politics of Friendship (Jacques
Derrida and Luce Irigaray). " differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies, 1998 Vol. 10, #3 pp.
159-184 - www. muse.jhu.edu
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his wife, his bi-polar disorder had mutated somehow into schizophrenia identical to
Martin's. The experimental nature of the writing style in this chapter is meant to reflect
the sort of internalization of the other that occurred between Martin and Althusser. It
makes an attempt toward the multiplicity of stories which can be told about these two
conjoining 'intensities,' telling different stories in tension between the primary text and
its own footnotes. The footnoting, therefore, outlines all possible textual sources on
Jacques Martin.
Apart from the mesh of Martin and Althusser, another key manifestation of Jacques
Martin, as evoked in the work of Michel Foucault, often isn't evoked at all. When it
comes to the naming of Jacques Martin in print or speech, unlike Althusser, Foucault
never mentions him. Yet, in excess of friendship and collaboration, it is the idea of
Martin, 'homme sans oeuvre, both the man and the symbol, which enabled Foucault to
draw out and define l'absence d'oeuvre (absence of work). The primary force of the
third chapter engages first, the discourse around the figure of Martin as his schizophrenia
begins to inhibit his ability to produce, and annihilates his potential for a magnum Opus,
or creative work in the Kantian sense and finally, the consequent writings which Martin's
inhibitions may have inspired in Foucault. Looking at work as both the action and an
attempt to dissolve alienation, work is also a necessary, constant, yet ultimately futile
attempt at an impossible metaphysical union. Foucault's absence of work, is then, both a
recognition of this futility and a recognition of the absence which occurs when
metaphysics, ( la Descartes in particular), is no longer the frame for rationality or ethics.
Foucault proposes that the absence of work is doubling of reason onto its alienated twin,
8
madness, in a fold that recognizes their identical nature and their resultant nonexistence.
It is this figure of Martin, 'the man without work', in Foucault's texts that draws out a
more developed reading of 'work' from the whole of Kant's theses in the Critique of
Pure Reason, nuancing and augmenting his overt discussion of work and beauty in the
Critique of Judgment, and influencing Foucault's own work in Madness and Civilization.
Along with the chorus chanted through the streets May 6 th, 1968, chapter four then asks:
'Where is Althusser?' in recognition of Althusser's own profound statements of self
doubt. Louis Althusser's life and career were both marked by a willingness to revisit,
revise and shift his own positions and now, 37 years after the May 1968 student revolts
and 25 years after he murdered his wife, Althusser's work and biography are being
revisited and viewed as examples of a philosophy of breaks and rupture. Yet as this
revisiting occurs, the staid influences of Althusser's Catholicism, his friendship with
Martin, his reliance on his wife, Helene, and his dependence upon the French Communist
Party marked his life and his career in ways yet unexplored. For Althusser, Martin was at
once a twin, a mentor and mirror. After Martin's suicide, Althusser began to merge his
own experiences with his memory of Martin, meanwhile merging the Catholic theology
of his youth with his newfound Marxist criticism. The result is a Catholic-esque,
Heideggerian anti-humanism and a proposed break in Marx's texts which mimics the
break between Old and New Testaments of the Bible. The absence of work in Althusser,
as in Martin and Foucault, is embodied not only in Althusser's work, but also in the
larger collectives at work in his time. In May 1968, in the French Communist Party,
schools and government this absence of work marked the speeches of the PCF, shadowed
9
the student revolt and hovered in Althusser's hospital cell as he towed the Party line and
retreated, habitually, into the safety of attempted anonymity.
Returning to Gilles Deleuze; after Foucault's death, Deleuze published a text in his
friend's honor. When questioned about his motives, he stated:
Ifelt a genuine need to write this book. When someone whom one loves
and admires dies, one sometimes has a need to make a sketch of him. Not
to glorify him, even less to defend him, not for memory but rather for
drawing this ultimate resemblance that can only come from his death, and
which makes one say 'that's he. 8
Between schizophrenia, work, friendship and the lives of Martin, Foucault and Althusser
there are moments, images and texts which tempt me to say, ah... 'that's he.' But those
moments pass quickly and reflect very different images, often conflicting; a theme which
I hope is echoed in the organization of Between Work's pages.
10
8 Ibid. p 68.
Chapter 1
Jacques Martin:
Jacques Martin: to single out his name in the subtitle to this section is to give deceptive
clarity and singularity to a figure seen only through the lens upon lens of others. From
the varying views that create what we know of Martin, his many lives fill many different
biographies of several different men and multiple human beings. These many narratives
of Jacques Martin are known to posterity only through silent and written dedications in
footnotes, in application forms and in story telling of the sort herein. As in the writing of
any story, sacrifices are made for what we consider clarity, continuity and readability.
While this is a story of Martin it is also of a story of those sacrifices and those processes
of subject making which require decisions, additions and primarily, deletions.
The easiest way to tell this story may be to begin in Jacques Martin's beginnings. His
birth, verified by one of the only remaining artifacts of his life, took place on the 18th of
May, at 5:30 am, 1922.9 Christened Jacques Henri Michel Francois Martin, he was born
to Felix Henri and Marguerite Martin in the 14 th arrondissement in Paris. As a child of
five, Jacques and his younger sister Jacqueline, age 3, were sent to live with their
maternal grandparents, the Tonnellots, in Ni6vre when their mother, Marguerite, was
diagnosed with a supposedly terminal case of Tuberculosis. In Ni6vre, Jacques and
Jacqueline attended school at the Lyce de Nevers, where Jacques, apparently an ornery
9 The documentation I found in J. Martin's application to L'Ecole Normale Superior indicates his name as
written here, "Jacques Henri Michel Francois Martin," as does a copy of his birth certificate found therein.
In his autobiography of Louis Althusser, Yann Moulier Boutang writes his name as "Henri, Jacques,
Michel Martin." See footnote 1. on page 453 of Moulier Boutang's Louis Althusser.
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student, rebelled against many of his teachers but finished each year, nonetheless, at the
top of his class. At age 14, Jacques returned to his early childhood home at 6 Rue
Froidevaux in Paris where the death of his grandfather and the stunning recovery of his
mother brought him to the Lyce de Henri-IV, where he entered as the class salutatorian.
Later, in 1938, after readjusting to life in Paris, Jacques took first place in the French
General Examsl° and went on to his final years at Henri-IV, from which he ultimately
applied for admittance to L'Ecole Normale Superior in 1941.
This above linear story of birth, childhood and Jacques' first step into adulthood is one
gloss on Martin. It is the story of a child who grows from boy to manhood, it is the
outline for a life that my lines cannot fill. A second beginning of Jacques Martin begins
in his time at L'Ecole Normale. To this day, J. Martin's first official file at the Ecole
Normale includes, among other things in his application for admittance, a testament to
the validity of his birth certificate, a handwritten curriculum vitae, reference letters from
past teachers in testament to his intellectual aptitudes, two testaments as to Martin's legal
status and a letter from La Commission Medicale. This set of artifacts outlines the second
Martin, contiguous with the first in his ability to excel in school, yet different in his
shadows, different in his relationships, different in his implications.
Jacques Martin's Ecole documentation includes a verification of his birth certificate,
issued by the Mayor of the XIV arrondissement on the March 13th, 1941. Fees ranging
from 2.5 francs to 9 francs were paid for this official documentation. Next, the
curriculum vitae, handwritten on graph paper and signed by J. Martin, restates Jacques'
'l See Moulier Boutang, Yann. Louis Althusser: Une Biographie, p 454.
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birth date and its location, confirming the veracity of his father's professed career as a
pharmacist, certifying Jacques scholastic lineage from before and after his return to Paris
at the age of' 15.1"
Martin's application file is filled with reference letters that sing the praises of one surely
destined for greatness at the Normale Superior. In his letters for promotion a past teacher
by the name of Monsieur Gusdorf states that Martin is one of the best qualified
candidates for the Ecole's 1941 aggregation by praising Jacques' solid philosophical
background and his valor in expressing ideas. Monsieur Piobetta proclaims that, from
what he has seen, Martin possesses a distinguished spirit, with an aptitude for discussion
and plenty of finesse. Finally, among others, a Monsieur Gaston Bachelard states that
Martin is a good student, with good diploma work and solid knowledge.
With this fine application, Jacques Martin was admitted to L'Ecole Normale Superior, yet
the documentation following Martin's admittance takes on darker and darker shadows
before it steals away altogether into a void. The first shadows appear in what is missing
from Martin's medical record. The paper included in Martin's files decrees that
Monsieur Martin, graduated from the Lyce Henri-IV, and under the execution of article
4 (of May 1904), "estpropre aux functions de l 'enseignement. " As this document, signed
by President Caurter-Luly and les assesseurs states, Martin was, in 1941, 'ready for the
functions of learning.' At this time, clearly, the schizophrenia which would later
envelope both Martin's functions and learning, was still silenced and unseen.
" The above documentation states the Jacques studied, as a child, at Henri-IV, and, before that, at the
Lyc6e de Nevers and the Lyc6e Blaise Pascal de Clermont-Fernand.
13
In Jacques Martin's second official folder at L'Ecole Normale, two handwritten
testaments bring the tensions of World War II into the history of Martin, the adolescent
male, the emerging subject. The first of these two statements reads as follows:
I, the undersigned, Martin Jacques Henri Francois Michel, born in Paris
on May 18, 1922, certify that I am not under the law of October 3rd, 1940,
regarding the statute of the Jews. Paris, March 21, 1941. J. Martin.'2
Nearly identical to the abovementioned handwritten testament by Martin, this graph
paper statement mirrors the official rhetoric required for entrance into the Ecole: 'I, the
undersigned, born in location X on the Xth day of the Xth month, 192X, certify that...'
Martin finished this formula with various statements, such as: 'my father is a pharmacist,'
'I have the approval of the Secretary for Public Jurisdiction for my application,' and, as
in the above quote: 'I am not under the law of October 3rd, 1940 regarding the statute of
the Jews.' The rhetoric comes to bear in another of Martin's testimonies:
I, the undersigned, Martin Jacques Henri Francois Michel, born in Paris
on May 18, 1922, certify that I am not under the arm of military law.
Paris, March 21, 1941. J. Martin.'3
'I, the undersigned... certify that I do not fall under the arm of military law,' signed by
Jacques Martin in 1941. In 1941 the German occupation of France had been in effect for
over a year. Though Poland was invaded by Hitler's Germany in 1939, the 1940 invasion
of Belgium came as a surprise to the French and the British. As both of the latter
countries rushed north to protect their neighbors, the German army made its way south,
through northern France to arrive in Paris for a coup and occupation. Moving the head of
government to Vichy released little pressure from the city of Paris. In 1941, Jacques
12 From Jacques Martin's file in the Ecole Normale student archives.
13 From Jacques Martin's file in the tcole Normale student archives.
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Martin could sign the release stating he was not part of the military, but within the span
of two short years, all of this would change.
During 1941 through early 1943, Martins ENS files are again filled with rave reviews,
marked by strong grades in his course work and continued positive appraisals of his talent
and intellect. In 1941 he took an 'AB' in Psychology and a 'B' in Philosophy and Logic.
In 1942, he took a 'B' in Sociology and Morals, an 'AB' in the History of Philosophy,
and was exempted from a special exam on living languages. Martin's longest reference
is a review by M. Cuirlluir, and outside the 10 th to the 15 th of February notation, the date
of this evaluation is unknown. M. Cuirlluir's statements are the only known evaluations
of Martin's teaching skills. During Jacques Martin's first week as a teaching assistant
Cuilluir notes that he responded with competence to the questions posed by his new
students. For the second week, Martin gave the course lecture from memory and while
Jacques was well informed, Cuilluir states that he was a bit dogmatic, with entrenched
ideas that needed nuancing. Overall, however, Martin made the natural mistakes of a
novice teacher: he was a bit precipitous in his responses, moving too quickly to answer
when his students did speak soon enough and he taught in such a way that his students
had difficulty taking notes. In addition to his teaching duties, Martin corrected papers on
the question: "Does philosophy give its value to the questions it poses or to the answers
that it brings about?" As his assessments of those papers matched those of Cuirlluir's, he
was congratulated on the outcome of his evaluations. The final word by Cuirlluir is that
Martin presented a good subject which filled the class with real enthusiasm.
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Looking at Martin's grades and his evaluations it seems that Martin's practice during his
first years at the ENS matched the quality of his paper work: he was eloquent,
communicative, and lively, if not a bit precipitous. With one remaining file, written by
Emile Br6hier on April 17th , 1943, the archives of Martin's time at the Ecole come to a
close. Again, Br6hier, like others before him, writes that Martin's previous years' work
is "good, with a sharp and solid spirit". The future looks promising... yet Martin's files
end here. There are no hints of a graduation, no signs of what was to become of Martin
post-ENS. It seems then, that we might end here, where we began with this Jacques
Martin; full of intellectual promise, genius and compelling communicative abilities. Yet,
by way of Moulier Boutang's work, another story and another Jacques Martin comes into
being. It is one, perhaps, that takes on more shadows than Martins' ENS files could hold.
In June of 1943, two months after the last noted reference letter as to Martin's work at
the ENS, the German occupation of France finally swept Martin into the militant, anti-
Semitic and unsteady public domain of World War II Paris. At this time Jacques Henri
Michel Frangois Martin and 249,999 other Frenchmen were called up for civilian service
in the ranks of the Service du Travail Obligitoire (STO). The STO began as a way to fuel
the German war machine and the German agricultural and industrial economies. After
the 1942 invasion of Belgium and France, workers from each conquered nation were
required, by the Nazi regime and its Vichy counterparts, to fill labor shortages in
exchange for their freedom from Bolshevism. Fritz Saukel, head of the STO under the
Germans, first forced all prisoners of war to work in German factories and industries.
Next, with the help of propaganda offering better wages and decent food, the French
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could choose to support their families by means of German employment. Then,
'exchanges' were promised: for every three French workers employed in Germany, one
prisoner of war would be released. Yet, by 1943, the exchange figures were disappointing
on both sides. By June of that same year, all unemployed French men between the ages
of 16 and 60, along with childless women between the ages of 18 and 35, would be
exported by train for work in Germany. In June of 1943, as pressure for STO recruitment
grew, Saukel demanded that all unemployed men between the ages of 20 and 22 would
be sent for service in Germany. This age group included and targeted France's best,
brightest and most energetic as they entered their respective Universities and coles. The
20-22 call enraged the French, and as resistance to STO grew, schemes were devised
whereby 'unemployed' students could falsify their French employment status and escape
STO deportation. According to work done by Yann Moulier Boutang, it was particularly
easy for normaliens, (students at the Ecole Normale), to evade the STO in this way.
Sympathetic industries and business run by past graduates or admirers of the Ecole
Normale offered normaliens false employment to escape the draft: Jacques Martin was
offered at least one such escape route. Yet, in June of 1943, Martin left France for
Francfort sur le Main, where he stayed in STO service until April 12, 1945.
Beginning in 1941, the year Martin applied to the Ecole, France's escaped and former
leader, Charles de Gaulle, began making speaches from London calling up the French to
resistance by way of British military service. In France as in the French colonies, French
loyalty was strained as de Gaulle formed the Free French Forces and lead them in a failed
march against the Vichy government. Still in this era of tension, Martin's decision to
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work in Francfort sur le Main is troubling. Louis Althusser, in his autobiography, speaks
for Martin on the issue of his STO service. He insists that it is Martin's Kantian ethic, his
inability to evade duty, that brought him to Germany. Yet once he was there, Moulier
Boutang claims, the intellectual prowess that echoed through his ENS files took its first
steps into a darkness that would Martin would ultimately claim in suicide. The date when
schizophrenia first took hold of Martin is unknown, but his abilities began to diminish in
Germany. 14
When Martin returned to the ENS from Francfort sur le Main, his situation did not
improve: he had trouble getting rid of the feeling that he had missed an opportunity. 5 In
a climate of resistance, STO's were not well received and Martin felt disenfranchised.
Apart from social friction, Martin deeply questioned his own relationship to German
philosophy and culture.
Yet in Frankfurt, at the heart of German philosophy is where he found the
resources for his mutation. He began to read a lot of Hegel, and in 1945,
he entered into Marx with both feet. ...he left [for Germany and the STO]
...as a Kantian very concerned with aesthetics and at the liberation he
found him[selfJ Marxist and Hegelian.16
What we know of Jacques' direct relationship with Marxism, and by extension, the Parti
Communiste Francais (PCF) is that he was never an official member. He attended
meetings, and along with Althusser, is remembered for a dedication that often superceded
that of his card-carrying comrades. What remains of Martin's views on Marxism in the
1950's are ideas passed through to the mind and works of Louis Althusser. Personally
14 Moulier Boutang, Yann. Louis Althusser: Une Biography. p.455
15 Translation of Moulier Boutang, Yann, p 456.
16 Translation of Moulier Boutang, Yann. Louis Althusser: Une Biography. p.456, itallics, (...) and [],
mine.
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and philosophically Althusser absorbed Martin, reading Marx, Hegel and Kant with
Martin's help and translations. When Martin was still in the early struggles with
schizophrenia, Althusser found an apartment for Martin at 6 Rue d'Ulm, next to his own
at 7. But by 1948, Martin's abilities to communicate and to write were fading fast.
Instead of leading Althusser into the depths of Marx, Kant and Hegel, Althusser now
became the coach for his teacher. When, in that same year, Martin failed his final
dissertation, his own situation became truly unstable. He lived in the pockets of his
friends, borrowing money and failing to show up for carefully and specially arranged job
interviews. 17 When offered a position at Progress in Lyon, Martin's desire for action was
outweighed by other factors whose origins are unknown. Fear? Anxiety? His illness?
Or was it what Moulier Boutang describes as Martin's more sarcastic, secret and
tormented political positions, as opposed to Althusser's finessed and gentile humours,
which kept Martin from taking the Progress position?'8
After turning down jobs, interviews and action, in Martin's defense Althusser said of
Jacques that to subject himself to the will and choosing of an other, a larger group, or
organization would bring a shadow Martin could not shake.'9 Yet not all of Martin's
7 Ibid. p. 456
18 Ibid. p 352.
19 In a recent interview, Gilles Deleuze describes his own response to L'appel de Stockholm in a way which
may shed light on Martin's own dilemma. Deleuze states: To be in the French Communist Party at this
time there, there were cell meetings all the time. It was the time - I have a bench mark - L'appel de
Stockholm. ... I do not know even any more what it was, the call of Stockholm, but that occupied a whole
generation of Communists. Then me, I had problems because I knew many communist historians, full of
talent, and I said to myself: good god, if they worked on their theses, that would be much more important
for the Communist Party, which at least would have work at handsome price instead of using them get
signatures for the call of Stockholm, stupid call on Peace or I do not know what... and I did not want any
part - I was not talkative, I did not speak - and to sign the call of Stockholm, that would have put to me in a
state of timidity, of panic... I never did anything to sign with anybody. Moreover, it was necessary to sell
Humanity, and all that... I did not want to have any part in the Party. ... All the respect of the human rights,
it is... really, one wants almost to take hold of the odious proposals. That formed so much part of this soft
19
actions were stilted: sometime after March 12th, 1950, Jacques joined millions of others
in signing 'appel de Stockholm. L 'appel was a petition, drafted by communist Frederic
Joliot-Curie, stating opposition to the use and production of atomic bombs. It reads as
follows:
We require the absolute prohibition of the atomic weapons, arms of terror
and the massive extermination of populations. We require the
establishment of a rigorous international control to ensure the application
of this measurement of prohibition. We consider that the first government
who would use, counter any country, the atomic weapon, would be
committing a crime against humanity and should be treated like a war
criminal. We call all the men of goodwill in the world to sign this call.20
Millions of people world-wide signed the Stockholm petition, and by doing so, they
participated in the mounting Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet
Union. According to the terms of the petition, the United States Military should be tried
as War Criminals for the bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima and all of its efforts
toward stockpiling an atomic arsenal would be called to a halt, putting the Soviet Union
in a clear atomic advantage. When the author of L 'appel de Stockholm was held at Ellis
Island and barred from entering the US, the tension surrounding the Stockholm document
hit its peak. All that remains of Martin's reflections on this situation is knowledge of a
signature of agreement with Joliot's petition.
thought of the poor period we're speaking of. It is pure abstract. Human rights, but what is that? It is pure
abstract. It is empty. It is exactly what one a few moments ago said for the desire, or what I tried to say for
the desire. The desire that does not consist in setting up an object, with saying: I wish this. One does not
wish, for example, freedom and liberty, etc. It is zero. One is in situations.. Interview segments from: G
comme Gauche: L'Ab6c6daire de Gilles Deleuze, 1988 . Yet, Martin, unlike Deleuze, did sign L 'appel.
Did he hope to 'shake the feeling that he had missed an opportunity'? By signing, did he hope to redeem
his status from its STO taint? Did he believe in L 'appel 's rhetoric and promise? Was he simply part of the
era where, as Deleuze said, L 'appel was the primary question?
20 Translation mine.
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In the height of these tensions, in 1951, Martin's mother Marguerite died from lung and
cardiac failures. Martin inherited a large sum of money from her, but also re-inherited
lasting problems with his father, Henri. Authoritarian and dominating, among other
things, Henri never forgave Martin for choosing philosophy rather than his own
unfulfilled medical aspirations. When Henri died in 1969, five years after Jacques,
neither father not son had resolved their conflicts with one another, and the disconnect
forced Martin to fend for himself without parental support, even through his struggle with
schizophrenia.
So, without work, without income, and without stable support, Martin dreamed of days in
Italy and a trip to the United States that would never result. In the meantime, Martin's
only documented actions after signing L 'Appel are his French translations of two German
texts: Ernest Wiechart's Misse Sine Nomine from 1950-1951, and Herman Hesse's Les
Jeu des Perles de Verre in 1955. Along with his translation of Hegel's L'Esprit du
Christianisme et son Destin, these works are all that remains of Martin's academic
textuality. And, apart from choosing their object, Martin's translations reveal little about
his own ideas and inclinations.
In his autobiography again, Althusser remembers a day when Jacques Martin announced
that he had destroyed all of his work. What and how much Martin destroyed is unclear.
What is clear is that upon destroying all of his own productions, Martin became a true
/'homme sans oeuvre - a term both Jacques and Michel Foucault had attributed to Martin
and his condition.
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His condition: nothing in Martin's academic files hint toward Martin's condition outside
of his past scholastic record. So it is up to this point, as I have attempted to put together a
timeline of sorts for Jacques Martins life that my work fails. Gaping holes, ignored
tangents, all that would complicate the linear nature of my narrative has been carefully
streamlined into the above story of one man and his life, part of it. I have, in effect,
falsified all that this chapter contains, as no life is as unilinear as the story I have told.
Particularly not the life of Jacques Martin, as he most likely considered himself no one in
particular.
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Chapter 2
'I think the colloquial word is co-dependence...' but the theoretical discussion may be
one of cannibalism, friendship, mourning and alterity. The textual collaborations of
Foucault, Jacques Martin and Louis Althusser can be seen as process of cannibalism, an
eating of the other, a digesting that blurs the boundary between self and other. Derrida
describes this process as the necessity of perpetual mourning, which, for Althusser and
Foucault began even before Jacques Martin's suicide in 1964.21
Upon the death of the other we are given to memory, and thus to
interiorization, since the other, outside us, is now nothing. And with the
dark light of this nothing, we learn that the other resists the closure of our
interiorizing memory. With the nothing of this irrevocable absence, the
other appears as other, and as other for us, upon his death or at least in
the anticipated possibility of a death, since death constitutes and makes
manifest the limits of a me or an us who are obliged to harbor something
that is greater or other than them; something outside of them within
them .22
While Derrida's work raises poignant questions as to who is mourned, what is mourned
and what responsible acts of mourning consist of and in, the stories of Foucault
Althusser's mourning in life and death of Martin illustrate two examples of the unsuccess
of successful mourning. Derrida describes this as follows:
23
21 Derrida, Memoires, p.6
22 Ibid, p. 35
Drawing on Freud's conceptualization of narcissism, Derrida is led to the
formulation: "we are never ourselves, and between us, identical to us, a
'self is never in itself or identical to itself" (Mdmoires 28). Where he
occupies psychoanalytic theory to theorize non self-identity at the heart of
identity, he is led to the position that we are inevitably cannibal selves.
The distinction between the abnormal (mourning) self and the normal self
of integrity could not be sustained. The normal self does not possess
integrity any more than the mourning self: The obvious lack of self-identity
that is seen when the other is mourned in fact pertains in a more
generalized way to every subject constituted with alterity at its heart. We
are the constant interiorization/incorporation of the other. 23
Derrida's challenge to the notion of self as individual also pushes forward intriguing
descriptions of mourning as essential to friendship as such. This introduction to
Derrida's rich discussion is also an introduction to the relationship between Althusser and
Jacques Martin. In Louis Althusser: Une Biography, Yann Moulier Boutang suggests in
passing that by the end of Althusser's life, and in his autobiographies, Althusser was no
longer writing his own story, but that of Jacques Martin's. Is it possible that in
remembrance, in mourning and in friendship Althusser had so merged Martin with his
own understanding of self, that any distinction between the two had been lost? The idea
is at least intriguing, and at most, entirely accurate. While Boutang only suggests the
possibilities, Althusser and Martin's legacies leave a trace of merging texts, memoirs and
actions that have prompted the following exercise. By laying partial stories of each man
onto the other, a picture emerges not of Martin, nor of Althusser, but of the one man each
may have been writing his life to become. At once an exercise in creative writing and
bibliography making, the following text might read for the possibilities such a merging of
tales might evoke:
23 Deutscher, P. "Mourning the Other, Cultural Cannibalism, and the Politics of Friendship (Jacques
Derrida and Luce Irigaray). " differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies, 1998 Vol. 10, #3 pp.
159-184 - www. muse.jhu.edu
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I was born in Paris, 15 miles away from the border of Algeria24. My
grandfather was a forest ranger and we lived a nice life there in the
mountains. As I had neither mother, nor father, it is with them, at ages 4
and 5, that I was born.25
'My name is Pierre Berger.'2 6
No, I'm sorry, that isn't true at all. In point of fact, I am named for a dead
man. He is my father's deceased brother, my mother's exanimate love. I
know the stories; my namesake died gloriously in the war - but with his
death, my own life ended before it began.27 I guess my father hurried
24 Both Jacques Martin and Louis Althusser told the fondest stories of their childhood in reference to the
time they spent living with their respective grandparents. While Martin lived with his maternal
grandparents in Nevers as his mother struggled with tuberculosis, Althusser went to live with his maternal
grandparents at the age 4 in order to avoid catching his younger sister's bout of scarlet fever. In the
beginning of Althusser's earliest autobiography, entitled The Facts, Louis Althusser's identification with
this period of life was stressed in the beginning of his first autobiography, where he wrote: My name is
Pierre Berger. Actually, that is not true. It was my maternal grandfather 's name and he died of exhaustion
in 1938, having ruined his health working on his own as a forest ranger for the National Forestry
Commission in the mountains ofAlgeria ...I was born at the age offour in theirforestry house in the Bois
de Boulogne overlooking Algiers. Excerpt taken from "The Facts " The Future Lasts Forever, p 289.
25 Althusser told Moulier Boutang that: [Martin's] parents had literally abandoned him, leaving him to fend
for himself. His father, a chemist, was a terrifying man who never opened his mouth in his son 's presence,
but his mother, who had been dead a long time, had left him a little money. I do not know how he managed
to live on it. (Taken from The Future Lasts Forever, p 133). The reasons why Martin never told Althusser
of his mother's tuberculosis is unknown. While both men (then small boys) relished the time they spent as
children with their grandparents, they both had a maternal aunt that caught their hearts as well. Did Martin
keep his mother and father's existence a secret to increase the image of similarity between himself and
Althusser? Did he consider them 'dead' to him even though he continued a relationship with his mother
through all of his father's anger? The answers are unknown.
26 See footnote 2. The Future Lasts Forever, p. 289.
27 Throughout Althusser's autobiographies and Moulier Boutang's biography of Louis Althusser, Althusser
speaks of struggling to be seen as someone, in his own eyes and in the eyes of others, particularly his
mother's. The following quote, found in Althusser's The Future Lasts Forever, reads: When I was born, I
was christened Louis. I know it only too well. For a long time, Louis was a name I literally detested. It
was too short, had only one vowel and ended in the sharp 'ee ' sound which offended me (bear this in mind
when I later come on to my fantasy of the stake). Doubtless it also said yes a little too readily on my behalf,
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home to report his brother's death, and seeing his brother's beautiful
mourning love, he took it upon himself to propose in his dead brother's
stead28. She accepted, but could never respect my father. To her he was a
flirting tyrant, a spendthrift chemist and a man with a penis that would
infect my mother with human flesh; my younger sister and I are just the
physical manifestations of that violence2 9'30 . Ultimately my mother found
her own degree of satisfaction: she never stopped pining for her first and
only love: she kept him alive inside my name31. I didn't stand a chance,
she loved him right through me. 32
and I rebelled against this 'yes' which corresponded to my mother's desire rather than to mine. Above all,
it contained the sound of the third person pronoun ('lui '), which deprived me of any personality of my own,
summoning as it did an anonymous other. It referred to my uncle, the man who stood behind me: 'Lui' was
Louis. It was him my mother loved, not me. p. 39
28 The story is told in The Future Lasts Forever on p 35: On a Sunday the Althussers would sometimes 'go
up' to the forestry house and, as their respective children were growing up and relatively well matched in
age... the parents agreed they should marry. I do not know why, but Louis, the younger boy, was paired
with Lucienne, and Charles, the elder with Juliette. In fact I know quite well; it was because their natural
affinity was obvious from the start. And the story continues: One day in 191 7, my father turned up alone at
the forestry house in the Bois de Boulogne and told the Berger Family that his brother Louis had been
killed while serving as an observer in a plane over Verdun. Them Charles took my mother aside in the
garden and ended up proposing that 'he should take Louis's place and marry her'. (p. 35).
29 In Chapters 3 and 4 of The Future Lasts Forever, Althusser describes Lucienne's unhappiness, her
disgust for all things sexual, and her continued love for the deceased Louis. It was Martin's father who was
a chemist and a pharmacist. In Yann Moulier Boutang's autobiography, Althusser recalled that Martin's
father was a tyrant, while his own was deeply sensual, flirting with his wife's friends in front of his own
family.
30 Louis Althusser and his sister, Georgette, were, seemingly, conceived by force upon a passive aggressive
wife and victim: Once the wedding had taken place, my father spent a few days with my mother before
returning to the front. My mother, it seems, was left with three appalling memories of that period: one was
of being sexually violated by her brutal husband; another was of seeing all her savings frittered away by
him in a single evening of eating and drinking (my father's behavior was surely understandable given that
he was returning to the front and perhaps going to his death. He was indeed a very sensual man... Finally
my father decided without further ado that my mother should at once give up her job as a teacher, and
therefore, the world she had chosen for herself. She would be having children, and besides he wanted her
to be at home just for him. Thereupon, he went back to the front, leaving my mother robbed, raped, and
shattered; physically brutalized, deprived of the savings she had patiently accumulated (something in
reserve, one never knows - sex and money are closely linked here), and cut offfrom the life she had begun
to make for herself and to enjoy. From The Future Lasts Forever, p 38.
31 In The Future Lasts Forever, p 53, Louis Althusser reports feeling lost under his mother's gaze and
affection: Both in [my mother's] presence and away from her, I always had the feeling that I did not exist in
or for myself... I always felt there had been a mistake, and that it was not really me she loved or was even
looking at... When she looked at me, it was not me she saw, but another person, the other Louis, who was
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To protect her young projection, my mother forced me to walk to school
each day with our housekeeper, my warden. I watched through the
windows as all the other boys played together before school and I stayed
inside, a prisoner to my mother's phobias33. I was a model student, and
yes, I was smug and rebellious with my teachers34 . I learned languages
with incredible ease: Moravian, Polish, German 3 5... perhaps no one saw
not me... He stood behind me, in some infinite and imaginary sky which was for ever marked by his death.
It was as if she looked through me. I disappeared under her gaze...
32 Louis Althusser, in Chapter V of his latter autobiography, The Future Lasts Forever writes: ...I knew
early on (children are unbelievably perceptive about things which adults fail to see, though such
perceptions are, certainly not conscious) that my mother whom I loved with all my heart loved someone else
through and beyond me, using my physical presence to remind her of a person who was absent, or rather
seeing his presence through my absence. It was only later I discovered this person had been dead a long
time. ...I was d9omed to be a pale reflection, that of a dead man, perhaps evens a dead person myself. p.
55
33 In The Future Lasts Forever on p 52, Althusser remembers: When we were in Algiers, I had to cross
only one quiet road to get to the local school, three hundred yards or so from where we lived (in the rue
Station-Sanitaire). But my mother hired an Algerian maid to take me there. We always arrived at school
too early, so that I would not be late (another of my mother's phobias). ...Instead of waiting outside until
the school opened, former colleagues of my mother had arrangedfor me to wait in the playground until the
teachers arrived... The French and Algerian boys would be playing marbles against the wall or running
around together quite freely, making a lot of noise. I arrived looking rather prim, since that was how I had
been taught to behave, accompanied by our Moorish maid who never said a word... Ten minutes later, the
other kids came running and shouting into the playground just as lessons were about to start. I was no
longer on my own, but there was now no chance of joining in with them. I found this (daily) ritual
unbearable and was ashamed of being a teacher's pet', just so that my mother would not worry about all
the risks I ran when I was in the streets: meeting the wrong sort ofpeople, catching germs, etc.
34 Yann Moulier Boutang reports that Jacques Martin was: Brillant, mordant, en rebellion avec nombre de
ses professeurs, il est toujours prix d'excellence. Taken from Louis Althusser, p 454. Martin's records
and documentation at the Ecole normale attest to his excellent academic performance and say nothing of
quarrels with his teachers. Louis Althusser, on the other hand, writes in his autobiographies that he was 'a
model student' - that he learned to emulate the preferences of his teachers, mastering the way to solid
grades by learning the quirks and prejudices of his instructors. From p 93 of The Future Lasts Forever: As
I suggested before, a teacher does not dislike seeing his own image projected back at him and often does
not even recognize it. .. What personal benefit did I derive form this? Of course there was the advantage of
immediately being promoted to the top of the class, of enjoying at last the respect of my young friends -
above all that of the senior boys - and of being accepted as one of the class. But at what price! I still
suffer from the sense of having practiced a real deception. I already suspected I was only able to exist
through artifice, by adopting characteristics which were not my own.
35 Martin's language skills exceeded that of his colleagues as he entered the Ecole normale in 1941. He
was exempted, by examination, from the living language courses required of his compatriots, and his grasp
of German earned him several contracts for translation, but more impressively, at a very early age this
ability enabled him to translate Hegel's L 'Esprit du Christianisme et Son Destin for his own sake and to the
benefit of Althusser. Althusser's dependence on this translation implies that he could not decipher the
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the two unspeakable languages I would later manifest. Regardless, I was
always at the top of my class.
During my adolescence, I changed schools and my mother changed my
sheets. I remember that there was an age, a time, when I woke up to find
them stained. My mother bore through me, to see my youth, to see my
unmanned masturbation, to see my filth3 6. Did she see me then at all? It
didn't matter. I soon made my first close friend at age 1237. We were
Catholic and we were Scouts. At night, after my friend and I had finished
hiking the countryside with our scout leader, we huddled close in our tent,
in the ravine, and in a parish theatre and against his back my penis grew
original German text and raises questions about his claims in The Future Lasts Forever, which read as
follows: I set about quickly learning this dialect with great enthusiasm and did so quickly and readily,
which didn 't surprise me in the least since the change of language both was both fascinating and easy for
me. Much later I had occasion to learn to speak a little Polish (a language which is so difficult to
pronounce, yet my pronunciation was such that Ipassedfor a native Pole,) the German as spoken in the
camps, and also literary German, and of course Lyc6e English which I pronounced with a splendid but
provocatively American accent that I picked up goodness knows where, probably form the radio... I learnt
these languages so easily that I decided I must 'have a gift, as they say, for foreign languages. ...Much
later, I came to the conclusion that my learning of languages and specifically my exact pronunciation of the
phonemes offoreign languages, to the extent that it was not clear where I was from, must have come both
from my desire to imitate and therefore to seduce, but also at the same time from a simple wish to do it well.
(p. 76)
36 I was nearly thirteen and we were living in Marseille. For some weeks, with considerable satisfaction, I
had registered an acute, burning sensation of pleasure at night in my sexual organs, followed by an
agreeable feeling of relief: In the morning I noticed large, dull stains on the sheets. It does not much
matter whether I was aware that I was having wet dreams, since I knew quite well it had something to do
with my sexual organs. On e morning I had got up as usual and was having coffee in the kitchen when my
mother came in looking solemn and serious and said: 'Come with me, son. 'She took me into my bedroom,
pulled back the blankets in front of me, and pointed to the large dull, dry stains on my sheets. She gazed at
me for a moment or two with a restrained look of pride on her face, which suggested that something
momentous had occurred. Feeling it was her duty to measure up to the occasion, she declared: 'Now you
are a man, my son!' I was overcome with shame and an unbearable sense of rebellion. My mother had
dared to grub around in my sheets, and had invaded my privacy, the most intimate part of my naked body,
in other words, my sexual organs, just as if she had looked into my pants or grabbed hold of my penis to
show it off (as if it belonged to her!); and she had a horror o sex. Added to this, she hadforced herself
(which I strongly sensed), as if it were her duty, to point it out and comment on it in such and obscene
manner. ...I had been raped and castrated by my mother, who felt she had been raped by my father (but
that was her affair, not mine). Family fate was indeed inescapable. From The Future Lasts Forever, p 51.
37 In The Future Lasts Forever, Althusser recounts his friendship with "Paul": It was love at first sight.
We became inseparable companions and were soon making plans together... from p 83.
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hard with pleasure.3 8'3 9 I didn't understand, at the time, about that
hardness. But from that time on, my friend and I shared everything; even
his childhood sweetheart4 0. While he swooned after the real thing, I
looked for my own copies of his love, which would always be shorter,
with dark hair and the same impressive profile. Still, I can't hide that I felt
betrayed when he married her4 1.
Had it not been for my grandparents, I may never have learned to be loved
at all. It was only in growing up with them that I learned what it was to be
seen and to be loved by someone in return. My grandfather gave love,
38 Did Althusser have homosexual tendencies? It seems more likely that in retrospect, Althusser has so
blended himself with Martin that he has taken on even his sexual preferences in his memory. In The Future
Lasts Forever, Althusser writes: Someone who had recently become afriend and had been in Germany on
compulsory labour service, not from political conviction - he favoured the communists - but out of
intellectual curiousity, was Jacques Martin; he understood me, understood us both. He was a homosexual
and though warm-hearted was an unhappy and somewhat distant person due to his latent schizophrenia; he
non the less became a valued friend I could ask him anything, unlike my fellow students at the Ecole to
whom I was ashamed to reveal my ignorance... Martin responded to me like the real brother I had never
had. "p. 133.
39 From The Future Lasts Forever: On one particular occasion we were camping near Allos in a beautiful
meadow looking down on the valleys... We stayed there alone, alone at last, tenderly entwined in our
mutual anguish and crying over our fate. I remember very clearly having an erection as we hugged each
other; that was all that happened but the unexpected erection was a most pleasurable experience... The
same thing happened during what was referred to as the first-class expedition', a test which enabled us to
win a special badge and earn promotion. ... We had a tent with us, but it was starting to rain so we looked
for shelter, which we found in a very tiny village by knocking on the local priest's door. He unlocked the
little parish theatre, and we lay down in each other's arms under our blankets, possibly as a way of keeping
warm but really out of love and affection. Again Ifelt myself having an erection. The same thing happened
the next day at noon when Paul started to have terrible stomach pains as we were going through a gorge.
He was writing about on the ground, and to comfort him I again took him in my arms. Once more Ifelt the
same unfulfilled pleasure in the pit of my warm stomach (innocent that I was I didn 't know it could be
satisfied...) pp. 84-85.
40 In a personal confession that may mix with memories of Martin, Althusser writes: One might have
thought I was destined to become a homosexual without my suspecting it, but that was certainly not the
case. Alongside the boys' troop there was a parallel troop of girls... One of them was a girl with dark hair
who was too tall for my taste, but she had a striking, classic profile andfascinated me because she was so
stunningly beautiful. Paulfell in love with her and naturally confided in me... From that point on I devoted
myselfwholeheartedly to this love by proxy, as if I loved the girl myself. See p. 85.
41 While Althusser states that he was supportive of Paul's decision to wed, Moulier Boutang's memoir of
Althusser shows that he fell into a depression at Paulo's decision and begged him to hold back.
29
instruction and gifts with no strings attached4 2. He taught me to shoot
rabbits, make compost, plant crops and laugh in the company of other
working men. But I was still a schoolboy with much to learn that he
would never think to teach me.
I continued to do well in school. In my final years of the Lyc6e, I took
first place in the national exam43. For my father, this might have been the
ticket to a first class medical education44 . Instead, I applied to L'Ecole
normale superior, and to his severe and lasting chagrin, I debated between
42 Althusser, on p. 65 of The Future Lasts Forever includes an interesting bit of text on his relationship with
his grandfather, which reads: I was very struck by the fact that my grandfather, who never stopped moaning
and groaning about everything with everyone else albeit quietly and through his moustache, behaved quite
differently towards me. In fact, I never for a moment feared he would abandon me. If he happened to fall
silent when I was with him, I never had a sense of anguish (which was not the case with my mother or
father!). For he only fell silent in order to talk to me. Each time it was to point out and explain the
wonders of the forest which I was not yet aware of. Rather than ask anything of me, he continued to
shower me with gifts and surprises. That is how I first came to realize what it is like when someone loves
you. The impression I had on each occasion was of receiving something without being expected to give
anything in return. This proved to me that I existed in my own right. Althusser also speaks of time in the
mill with his grandfather and the enjoyment he procured from watching the men, with their rough hands
and straight speech, as they labored and later and ate and drank together in celebration of a hard day's
work. Althusser's time as a war prisoner, as we will see later, seems to revive these memories of male
camaraderie in a way that helps him enjoy his imprisonment more than his freedom. With this in mind, one
wonders about the references to abandonment and silence that are in the above quote, and whether his
experience and pleasure in the house of his grandparents compares to his experience and pleasure as a
POW.
43 Excerpt from page 454 of Louis Althusser: Une Biography, by Moulier Boutang, which translates
roughly as follows: "In October, 1936, he earned the French first prize in open competition, (he already
had the affinity for philosophy, said one of his examiners). The national Ministry of Education offered the
laureates a voyage to Dahomey. A picture was taken during the voyage. It is of a young blonde man with
a great face, still a little thin, with large glasses, who is distracted from the camera's objective."
44 While few of Martin's disagreements with his father are known, Moulier Boutang writes about a typical
father son argument over professions that turned into a permanent divide between Martin and Henri. Page
454, Louis Althusser: Une Biography, translated roughly as follows: "It was a Professor Michel Alexandre
and his wife who would mark him [Martin] profoundly. According to his sister, Jacqueline, Madame
Alexandre who set him up against his family by telling him that the trade of a pharmacist is the trade of a
'tradesman'... He had a violent argument with his father regarding the legion of honor. He found in this
period, but not without its own evils, a certain relationship with his mother, but completely revolted against
his father, who looked on his scholarly orientation with an evil eye. He slackened more and more the ties
with Denfert Place, his family home." Apparently Martin's father had hoped his son would study to be the
doctor he could not be, and was angered by Martin's course of study. Is it too much to say that something
else must have been wrong to provoke such a permanent divide, or was it simply the strong will of a father
against the growing will of his son?
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philosophy and law4 5. I was, again, at the top of my entering class and a
star candidate for the eventual aggregation46.
After a year of deliberation then, I chose a course (and at least a near
future,) in philosophy generally, and Kant particularly. To live as if each
act would be universalized, that is what I knew when I left the Ecole to
serve my country4 7. I was a Kantian for the Germans, and a prisoner of
war fbr the French, but I was never a Nazi for anyone. Six years in the
German camp taught me to masturbate, to read Marx and Hegel, and to
love the sanctity of the infirmary48 . I made friends in the camp. It was
45 In an interesting yet short reference letter in Martin's ENS files, a professor notes that after some debate,
Martin chose to study philosophy over law. The debate is attributed to Jacques personal enjoyment of
philosophy outside of the University climate, and his fear that this enjoyment might change or be stifled
once his work in the field was formalized or requisite. Echoing Martin's later decisions not to formally join
the French Communist Party, it is possible to guess that Martin, unlike Althusser, resisted group adhesion
and corporate decision making. I will return to this later in the text.
46 Eventually, however, both Martin and Foucault would go forward for the aggregation and be rejected.
While Foucault would persist and eventually publish his groundbreaking aggregation thesis on madness
and confinement, Martin suffered with schizophrenia to the point that he was unable to produce cohesive
thoughts and work.
47 Althusser felt that Martin's 'Kantian' obligation to duty, and inability to avoid fulfilling such obligations,
was a large part of what determined Martin's actions. See page 454 of Louis Althusser: Une Biography for
the following quote, translated roughly, this reads: "At the time he was very Kantian. It was in the name of
Kant ("act as if your maxim was universal") that he refused the easily accessible options for Normaliens to
evade departure in STO."
48 Althusser spent four years within a German camp for POWs and Martin spent two years in mandatory
labor service in Francfort sur le Main. The combined six years were quite different experiences for both
men. While Martin's STO service shook his Germanic cultural roots, Althusser foiled his own plots for
escape from imprisonment. Martin found solace in Hegel and Marx, while Althusser clung to the security
he felt with the confines of the prison camp. In The Future Lasts Forever, Althusser writes: In actual fact I
have to admit I began to feel quite at home as a prisoner (I was genuinely comfortable because I felt
genuinely secure under the protection of German guards and behind barbed wire). I was untroubled by my
parents and I confess I that Ifound life easy because I enjoyed the comradeship of real men and I was
happy because was well protected. We were behind barbed wire, watched over by armed guards and
subjected to the vexations of roll-calls, searches, fatigues. We were very hungry during the first and last
years, yet how can I explain it, Ifelt secure andprotectedfrom all danger simply because I was a prisoner.
I never seriously thought of escaping, despite the example of severalfriends who tried their luck as many as
six times. Yet for Althusser, having found a plan of escape, he was satisfied with simply knowing a solution
which he would never put into practice: In essence I hadfound a way of escapingfrom the camp without
actually leaving and of remaining a prisoner in order to escape! Though I perfected my plan, I did not
carry it out, but simply prided myself on the fact that I hadfound 'the solution '. Having proved that I could
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one of the times of my life when I felt most secure. Caught within the
barbed wire I was again among my grandfather's working men: escaping
that primary, terrifying tool of the state: the family, my family, our
family.49 Although it couldn't have been otherwise... I had no other
choice at the time.
When I returned to Paris from Germany, I met the wife I would later
kill...50 Yes, kill. She was Jewish and I was unfaithful 51. Before and after
do it, there was no need to put it into practice. I have often thought since that the 'solution' came from
deep within me, combining afear of danger and the absolute needfor security to produce afictitious act of
bravery. See page 108.
49 On page 104 of The Future Lasts Forever, Althusser begins to discuss the state's use of the family for its
own ends. His reliance on Marx here comes to the fore, yet as Althusser mentioned briefly on p 110, just
after the following passage, he heard of Marx for the first time while in prison, and had met only one lone
communist at this point in his life. In the following quote, Althusser must be looking retrospectively, post-
Martin's re-introduction of Marx to Althusser. Whose idea Althusser is espousing is difficult to ascertain.
Yet, given the climate of his friendships with Foucault and Martin, this unattributability may be the further
mark of key authorship.
50 The story of H61ene Lgotien's death is told in Althusser's autobiography, The Future Lasts Forever.
And while the event was broadcast in the media, Althusser's own description is an eerie tale of
impersonality: Suddenly, writes Althusser, I was up and in my dressing-gown at the foot of the bed in my
flat at the tcole normale... Helene, also in a dressing-gown, lay before me on her back. Her pelvis was
resting on the edge of the bed, her legs dangled on the carpet. Kneeling beside her, leaning across her
body, I was massaging her neck. I would often silently massage the nape of her neck and her back. I had
learnt the technique as a prisoner-of-war from little Clerc, a professionalfootballer who was an expert at
all sorts of things. But on this occasion I was massaging the front of her neck. Ipressed my thumbs into
the hollow at the top of her breastbone and then, still pressing slowly moved them both, one to the left, the
other to the right, up towards her ears where the flesh was hard. I continued massaging her in a V-shape.
The muscles in my forearms began to feel very tired; I was aware that they always did when I was
massaging. Helene 'sface was calm and motionless; her eyes were open and staring at the ceiling.
Suddenly, I was terror struck. Her eyes stared interminably, and I noticed the tip of her tongue was
showing between her teeth and lips, strange and still. pp. 16-17.
51 Page 117 of The Future Lasts Forever, Althusser writes: Gradually I discovered her background. She
was born of a Jewish family, by the name of Rytmann from the borders of Russian and Poland, who had
fled the pogroms. She herself was born in France in the Eighteenth District, near the rue Ordener, and
used to play in the gutter with other children from the same street. Additionally, Althusser's cacophony of
amorous tales in The Future Lasts Forever is usually read as his own justifications against accusations that
H6lne was controlling his every move. Still he writes that he repeatedly introduced her to each of his
lovers, waiting for her response and approval. Naturally this was never given, and according to the
autobiography, Hl6ne became melancholy and remorseful in response. See pp. 154-155.
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my return, that is when the sickness began52. But I loved her, my future
wife. In fact I literally physically loved her, my first, for the first time in
my life. Immediately afterward, I had to be hospitalized 53. The
depression was unbearable and I swore (falsely) that I would never make
love with her again; I feared that I couldn't bear it.
As the story of Martin and Althusser continues, the two begin to cannibalize one another
until all that they never share is Martin's suicide. Althusser's autobiography constantly
52 In the chapter titled "Les Jeu des Perles de Verre", Moulier Boutang describes the only picture of
Martin's schizophrenia which exists on paper: his obituary, written by Louis Althusser. Along with a
dedication written by Althusser in For Marx which alludes to Martin as 'the friend... in the most terrible
ordeal', this obituary provides a unique sketch of a man suffering from what we would now call mental
illness. Just who that man is, be it Jacques Martin or Louis Althusser, is allusive. The obituary reads as
follows, from p 451 of Louis Althusser:
"He decided it was enough when he knew that he was going to lose his reason of living: his intelligence,
the ultimate edge of this intelligence was, in the final count, a feature drawn from hope, this act of
clearness: to precede the night.
Perhaps he had known it was coming? Perhaps it was a recourse. We at least, cannot survive to him without
the tearing at this thought. But which recourse? He knew for a long time, knowing its evil, that in last
authority, he alone could decide to live.
He fought during twenty years, cold, calm, complete, precise, never weakening nor yielding, without even
one word of complaint: worthy. He chose death deliberately so as not to live another death in the night of
an anguish without term.
Others before him died, having lucidly risked the limits, in science or the action, and died from the effects
of their freedom. He was unable to choose these limits: life had enclosed him forever there, in this dreadful
captivity, he made an extraordinary experiment of the intelligence: its only freedom.
Twenty years before us he saw what we start to foresee; in twenty years we will be still at his school. The
thought which he left, in two sixteen year old writings, and in all his acts and matters until the end, had an
edge of his death: a blade."
53 The story of Althusser's hospitalization is intriguing. He tells it as follows: The' drama' began to gather
pace afew days later when Helene kissed me while sitting beside me on the bed, still in my little room in
the sick-bay. I had never kissed a woman (though I was thirty!), and certainly never been kissed by one.
Desire welled up within me and we made love on the bed. It was new, thrilling, exhilarating, and violent.
When she left, I was plunged into a profound state of anguish from which I could not escape. I telephoned
He'ldne the next day to tell her very firmly I would never make love with her again. But it was too late. The
sense of anguish would not go away, indeed it got more unbearable with each passing day... Helene was
very worried and advised me to consult a specialist... We made an appointment with Pierre Mdle, the great
psychiatrist of his day, who questioned me for a long time and came to the conclusion I was suffering from
'dementia praecox '() I was put in Esquirol ward, a huge communal ward, and immediately cut offfrom the
outside world... page 124, The Future Lasts Forever. Althusser's second doctor later stated that he was not
suffering from dementia praecox, but from melancholia, and he recommended shock treatments twice a day
for twelve days.
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alludes to an invisibility and feeling of nonexistence that is made poignant in the
following confession, he writes:
Having no authentic existence of my own, doubting myself to the point of
believing I was insensitive, and feeling I was incapable of sustaining an
emotional relationship with anyone, I was reduced to practicing artifice,
seduction, and deception to love others (since love others calls forth love
in return)... Since I did not really exist, I was simply a creature of
artifice, a non-being, a dead person who could only love and be loved by
means of artifice and deception which mimicked those whose love I
sought and whom I tried to love by seducing them.5 4
But was Althusser being too self-reproachful in this confession? Is it not the nature of
friendship to somehow absorb bits of the other, to digest them into oneself? Again, we
return to Derrida, who writes "we are never ourselves, and between us, identical to us, a
'self' is never in itself or identical to itself" The ending of this friendship and this
cannibalism can only occur in death, when the mutual digestion of the other is ended and
replaced by the work of mourning. If we finish the above 'story' of an Althusser who is
at once Jacques Martin, and vice versa, we would be forced to conclude with a
separation, one in which the shared 'I' of the above narrative sinks back into a singular
human body that dies physical deaths. Derrida, in writing on the death of his own friend,
Paul de Man, explains this as follows:
...we know ourfriend to be gone forever, irremediably absent, annulled to
the point of knowing or receiving nothing himself of what takes place in
his memory ... it would be unfaithful to delude oneself into believing that
the other living in us is living in himself: because he lives in us and
because we live this or that in his memory, in memory of him.ss
Therefore, as Althusser writes his autobiography, it is possible that the crosswork he
evokes between his life and Martin's is not a writing of deception, but of honesty; an
54 Althusser, Louis. The Future Lasts Forever, p 89. Emphasis mine.
55 Derrida, Jacques. Memoires, p. 21
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honesty that both and singularly recognizes and speaks of the alterity of Martin and
Martin's death in himself, and the union via digestion that arose and persisted from their
friendship even after death. Thus the story may end:
Soon there after, I went to the library, I withdrew my work and I took it
back to my apartment5 6. I gave it only as a gift to myself in my friend
Louis Althusser. I remembered Beloyannis; the true revolutionary5 7. He
died with a red carnation across his chest. When they found me I had a
rose :in his stead. In my room, in the 16 th district, not far from the rue
d'Ulmn where I began.
56 No thesis exists on file at the tcole Normale for Jacques Martin, though it is rumored that Martin may
have given the only copy to Althusser before committing suicide.
57 Beloyannis was a Greek Communist, known as the 'Man with the Red Carnation'. He was shot for his
revolutionary action and became an icon and a martyr for many.
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CHAPTER 3
The story of Jacques Martin, as told through the work of Michel Foucault, often isn't told
at all. When it comes to hallowing the ideas or the impact of the friendship that Foucault
shared with Jacques Martin, in print or speech Foucault scarcely mentions him. Unlike
Althusser's constant acknowledgments of Martin's friendship and impact, it is in
Foucault's discourses and formations of work, or rather, the absence of work, that
Martin's figure begins to emerge. In excess of friendship and collaboration, both the man
and the symbol that was Martin played an important role which enabled Foucault to draw
out and define l'absence d'oeuvre. More importantly it is the figure of Martin in
Foucault's texts that draws out a more developed reading of 'work' from the whole of
Kant's theses in the Critique of Pure Reason, nuancing and augmenting his overt
discussion of work and beauty in the Critique of Judgment. The story of Foucault and
Martin is then, not only and intriguing story of friendship and collaboration, it is the story
of an idea and its development from Kant, through Heidegger to the pen of Foucault and
the pages of his texts.
Before examining the absence of work, or what Shoshana Felman calls
'unaccomplishment at work', I would like to explore two readings of the formation of the
concept 'work' itself, as it was first defined by Kant. From there I would like to explore
the link between Kant's notion of work and Foucault's theorization of its absence by
looking at two of Foucault's publications which mere most markedly influenced by the
figure of Jacques Martin and his friendship with Foucault: L 'Histoire de La Folie a l 'age
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Classique and an article entitled "Madness, the Absence of Work". Following this, it is
important to look through the lens of Martin, as symbol and as friend, at attempts made in
secondary literature which systematize Foucault's own work along the lines of a false
concept of an absence of work, in order to offer an alternative viewing which allows
Foucault's own work the freedom from oeuvre making it both seeks and deserves.
While compatriots at the Ecole Normale Superior, Michel Foucault was Jacques Martin's
junior by four years. Yet as schizophrenia's hold on Martin became greater and greater,
it was Foucault, among a handful of others, who took responsibility for Martin by loaning
him money and the support of friendship. Before ending his own life, Jacques Martin
suicided all traces of his own work and production, embodying the absence of work not
only in his struggle with schizophrenia, but also in the physical destruction of all that he
had thus far produced.
The personal archives [of Jacques Martin] apparently did not conserve
even a trace of his text. Althusser explained one day that Martin had
destroyed all his papers in order to be the other part, "A philosopher
without work", an expression that Foucault and he himself had
consecrated, and he that provided it was probably Jacques Martin
himself 58
In the act of destroying his writing, his work, the possibility of an oeuvre, Martin was
doubling in on himself. At once creating and negating his own discourse, closing the
dialectic between a subject and his objects, a man and his work, 'absence d'oeuvre took
its shape in the subject of Martin. After his death, Martin's nickname took on new
58 Moulier Boutang, Yann. Louis Althusser. p.258 Les archives personnelles [de Martin] ne conservent
apparemmentpas trace de ce texte. [Althusser] avait explique unjour que Martin avait detruit tous ses
papeirs et que c 'etait d'autre part << un philosophe sans oeuvre >>, expression que Foucault et lui-meme
ont consacree, et qui provident probablement de Jacques Martin lui-meme. Translations are mine
throughout.
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textual significations: Foucault's prolific post-Martin writings doubled a void that evoked
both Martin's life and his madness in l 'absence d'oeuvre.
In 1965, one year after Jacques Martin's suicide in Paris, Foucault published L 'Histoire
de la Folie a 'age Classique59 . This piece, written while Foucault was in Sweden,
recasts the emergence of madness as the twin of unreason. The resultant work opened up
an alternate, post-Hegelian and non-Marxist trajectory for history writing, the impact of
which has filled many prior theses to date. Foucault's story in L 'Histoire plays upon a
rereading of Descartes, whereby Foucault takes the position of the infamous. 'Cogito Ergo
Sum' and demonstrates that in the shadow of Descartes certainty, madness is struck from
the record of normative reasoning. The first move toward this exclusion happens as does
the 'Cogito', exclusively within the subject of Descartes himself. In his first meditations,
Descartes shuns the possibility of madness within his own reason as follows:
And how shall I deny that these hands and this body are mine? Unless
perhaps I were to compare myself to those lunatics whose brains are so
disturbed and blurred by their black bilious vapors that they go around
calling themselves kings, while they are very poor, and saying that they
are clothed in gold and crimson, while they are completely naked, or
imagining that they are jugs or have a body of glass... But then, they are
madmen, and I would hardly be less demented if I followed their
example. 60
In these statements and in their implications, reason and madness became mutually
exclusive counterpoints for Descartes. As Descartes is 'surely' sane by dint of his ability
to reason, madness is auto-excluded from the realm of reason, and ultimately, from the
59 Foucault, Michel. L 'Histoire de la Folie a I 'age Classique. Schoenhof Foreign Books, 1972.
60 i[:i?,K. tNCE!
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realm of production, from the realm of great works and the making of oeuvres6 1 . (We
will explore this link from reason to oeuvre making below.) But what if Descartes had
followed through with his own doubt? What if he had denied the reasonableness which
came so plainly to his senses? In his own words, he "...would hardly be less demented if
[he] followed their [the mad's] example." With 200 years hindsight, we know that
Descartes chose the path of certainty and self-confidence, following a route that began
with 'I' and ended with the alienation of subject and object positions. Retracing
Descartes arguments back to the point of doubt, Foucault takes up the possibility
Descartes didn't follow in his work in Madness and Civilization.
In the chapter ofL 'Histoire de la Folie that was to be his first, translated into English as
'The Great Confinement,' Foucault retraces Descartes steps and tells the intermingling
stories of work, reason and madness which developed in the seventeenth century out of
Descartes hypotheses. As Descartes had separated reason from unreason, during 'The
Great Confinement' the mad were sentenced to seclusion, separated from reasonable
society. The basis for this seclusion however, was not confronted in its origin: rather, in
the early stages of their confinement, the mad were viewed first as divine outcasts, close
yet to redemption through their utter helplessness before God and man. With the coming
of industrialized society, this view slowly shifted to reflect not the saintliness of the mad,
but the sloth they came to embody.
61 Felman, Shoshana. In a rich discussion in "Madness and Philosophy or Literature's Reason" Felman lays
oul a connection between Foucault's work with madness and reason and Descartes own project. Felman
focuses her discussion on the importance of literature as an avenue for Foucault's own discourse on reason
and madness outside philosophy and notes Derrida's critiques ofL 'Histoire de la Folie.
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If it is true that labor is not inscribed among the laws of nature, it is
enveloped in the order of the fallen world. This is why idleness is
rebellion - the worst form of all, in a sense: it waits for nature to be
generous as in the innocence of Eden, and seeks to constrain a Goodness
to which man cannot lay claim since Adam.62
In this way idleness made its way toward the definition of madness. It is within these
confines of idleness that the mad (the un-reasonable), as Foucault's PhD thesis dictates,
were subsequently confined, along with criminals, vagrants and the poor until they could
be cured and restored to a healthy productivity.
In order to be cured of their sloth and idleness, the mad were, of course, put to work. Yet
diligence and productivity alone were unable to earn healing individuals a place among
the reasonable. Foucault writes that it was through their ability to value work, to see the
goodness of industry, that the mad were socially reintegrated and redeemed.
It was in these places of doomed and despised idleness, in this space
invented by a society which had derived an ethical transcendence from the
law of work, that madness would appear and soon expand until it had
annexed them. 63
Institutions that had been constructed to seclude the mad now allowed the diligent
working prisoner to be released back into society, not for his merit as a laborer exactly,
but more precisely for his ability to recover the ethos of the bourgeois distrust of idleness.
Only when the mad could see the reasonableness of reason, the reasonableness of life in
the confines of societal dictates, could they be released into the potential for a full and
productive life.
62 Foucault, Michel. L 'Histoire de la Folie a / 'age Classique. p 56
63 Ibid, p 57.
40
As time passed, madness was more precisely defined in the then newly emerging work of
19th century psychology, and the attempt to isolate reason from madness became all the
more intense. Yet in its intensity, the folly of bifurcated reason becomes all the more
sketchy and difficult to pin down. For the classical age that Foucault describes, the
following definition holds:
Imagination is not madness. Even if in the arbitrariness of hallucination,
alienation finds the first access to its vain liberty, madness begins only
beyond this point, when the mind binds itself to this arbitrariness and
becomes a prisoner of this apparent liberty. 64
"Binding to the arbitrary:" only a strong conception of rationality could delineate
arbitrariness from its other. However, according to Foucault's archeology, it was the
search for a strong rationality in the midst of absent foundations which spurred on the
exclusion of madness from reason just as Descartes had shunned his own mad demon in
pursuit of the 'cogito'. In a posthumous twist of his theses, Foucault negates Descartes
demon of deception by making him into an omnipresence. In other words, though
Descartes feared that a mad demon might be deluding him into speaking folly in what he
believes to be truth, Foucault's work digs up the archeology of such a distinction between
reasonable truth speaking and unreasonable madness and negates their divisions. Within
the thinking subject, inline with Foucault and contrary to Descartes, no distinction
between reason and unreason can be made. Madness, according to Foucault, is therefore
an 'other reason;' it is reason in all of its unreasonableness:
The marvelous logic of the mad which seems to mock that of the logicians
because it resembles it so exactly, or rather because it is exactly the same,
and because at the secret heart of madness, at the core of so many errors,
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64 Ibid, p 93.
so many absurdities, so many words and gestures without consequence,
we discover, finally the hidden perfection of a language. 65
In 'the perfection of a language' all its own, men can be made of glass for reasons as
sound as those supporting the Pythagorean Theorem. Or, more precisely, for Descartes to
reason that he is simply by virtue of thinking is no more reasonable than the thinking of a
woman who believes she is a bird simply by virtue of her hunger for worms.
Yet, Foucault concedes that distinctions between the mad and the reasonable have
repeatedly and historically been made and particular sign posts emerged to mark out the
differences therein. It is here that work, travail and arbiter become just such signposts
for sanity in individuals. Kant outlines not only this sanity, but also its potential for
greatness in a way that would set an agenda for philosophical discourse for years in his
own wake. Yet it is not this reading which illuminates the absence of work marked by
Martin and the work of Foucault. Foucault and Martin's notion of the absence of work
finds its origins and its contingencies in the internal break down of Kant's agenda. For
this reason, before looking fully into the void and absence of work that Foucault
theorizes, let us first look at Kant's foundational definitions of work and his own
processing of working through the Critique of Pure Reason, as they reflect on the topic
at hand.
In a path between reason and unreason and in the historical glorifications of work and
Work, Immanuel Kant's notion of 'Opus' plays a foundation role as the antithesis of
Martin's nickname (in all its contingency), and in setting apart not only the genial, but
65 Ibid, p 95.
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also the mad. At first glance we see in Kant Descartes' error repeated as it seems that,
once again, it is a human being's ability to work and ultimately to produce true Work
(with-a-capital-W), that separates the men from the boys, the reasonable from the
unreasonable, the sane from the mad. Yet at a second glance, while Descartes mistakes
his own thinking for the one and only sound and reasonable descriptor of reality, Kant
separates human descriptions from the possibilities of what might be and opens a
momentary space where madness might also be productive in a work not surprisingly
titled The Critique of Pure Reason.
While Michel Foucault's work is an illustration of the false split between madness and
reason, in The Critique of Pure Reason Immanuel Kant is dealing with his own
illustration of what he considers to be another false split: that between reason and
sensibility. To resolve this rationalism vs. empiricism debate that preceded him, Kant's
work in the Critique is the analysis of precisely what reason can and cannot know. In the
introduction to the 1781 first edition of The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant writes:
...the grand question is what and how much can reason and
understanding, apart from experience, cognize, and not, how is the faculty
of thought itselfpossible?6 6
In a radical turn, which Kant compares to the Copernican Revolution, Kant shifts the
'knowability' of an object from the object itself to the capabilities of the knower.
It has hitherto been assumed that our cognition must conform to the
objects; but all attempts to ascertain anything about these objects a priori,
by means of conceptions, and thus to extend the range of our knowledge,
have been rendered abortive by this assumption. Let us then make the
66 Kant, Immanuel. Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason, First Edition, 1781.
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experiment whether we may not be more successful in metaphysics, if we
assume that the objects must conform to our cognition.67
Kant here distinguishes between the in-itself of an object and the mechanism by which
our judging faculty operates on that given object to produce cognition.
Reason must approach nature with the view, indeed, of receiving
information from it, not, however, in the character of a pupil, who listens
to all that his master chooses to tell him, but in that of a judge, who
compels the witnesses to reply to those questions which he himself thinks
fit to propose. To this single idea must the revolution be ascribed, by
which, after groping in the dark for so many centuries, natural science
was at length conducted into the path of certain progress. 68
The analogy of the judge is a firm one in Kant. The judge applies laws which were
determined outside his or her person: i.e., the judge conveys the ground, while the
grounded is formed and exists outside the judge. This ground, for Kant, is inaccessible,
yet he reasons that the methods by which the judge applies such laws can and should be
examined to determine the limits of our understanding. This is the project he undertakes
in the Critiques themselves, and it is this project which ultimately brings down the walls
of metaphysics: in the distance between the judge and the ground of his/her judgments we
enter this realm of metaphysics and it is here that we begin an eternal 'work' opened up
by Kant and closed by no possible end.
Though Kant's project was a pre-examination of the tools used to construct a
metaphysics, the end of metaphysics and its projects is commonly attributed to the work
started in Kant's Critiques. The reasons for this lie in the above described abyss, which
Kant outlines between the judging subject and the object of his judgments:
67 Kant, Immanuel. Preface to the Critique of Pure Reason, Second Edition, 1787.
68 Ibid.
44
Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider
questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own
nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the
mind9
Here Kant's agenda is set: How can one consider questions which are beyond the realm
of possible consideration? He concludes that as such questions exceed the bounds of
reason and experience, they are questions of an empty metaphysical nature; they are
questions which the human mind cannot answer. Yet the end of metaphysics was not the
aim of Kant's project: in fact he had aimed to analyze the foundations of knowing which
might make way for the construction of a new, finally stable metaphysics. In setting up
the tools for this future stability, Kant's earlier works on dynamics comes into play.
These dynamics are the glue Kant applies to a crumbling metaphysics; it is a glue picked
up by Foucault and Martin, as we shall later see.
In far different language than that of the Critiques Kant wrote earlier works such as Spin-
Cycle (1754) and Living Forces (1749), which analyze Newton's Principia Mathematica,
among other things. Relevant to our discussion, however is the fact that in these
scientific studies Kant also anachronistically iterates the abyss he will later define
between perception and the in-itself. This abyss is bridged, for Kant, by the:
...proposed bond offorce and space - 'force" understood as momentum-
energ); Kant's active essence of substance, and "space" defined as Kant's
dimensional continuum. For Kant, force grips the void, holding it as a
dimensional presence that localizes the original pulse. Force extends
space, ordering it, and space places force, governing it. Space
dynamically expands; force structurally acts. Each needs the other.
Without force, space would lack structure (Abmessungen or
Dimensionen,) and could not place a world. Without space, force could
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69 Ibid., p. 1
not be a field. Force is spaced and space is forced. This is their bond.
Indeed: mass stretches spacetime, and spacetime grips mass.70
In this complicated mass of force and space, Kant describes a dynamic inter-dependence
wherein the energy and momentum of force finds form in the structure of space. The two
never merge, and due to their interdependence, they cannot exist individually, it is in their
interplay that substance is. If this sounds like the reason/experience dialogue later found
in Kant's Critiques, the resemblance is not unfounded. Between reason and experience,
there is an absent thing-in-itself that neither faculty of understanding can apprehend. In
this absence, according to Kant, we work out the capacity for knowing and acting in a
world which, for lack of access to the thing-in-itself, is determined by the mental
structures and categories we place on it. In this absence we work out our ability to know
in and endless pursuit of something always beyond reason's reach. It is in the absence of
this very thing-in-itself that 'work' is again defined in Kant. It is in the absence of this
very thing-in-itself that the absence of work takes shape.
Classical notions, definitions and foundations of work in Kant are traditionally derived
from his writings in the third critique, the Critique of Judgment. Herein, Kant's main
question regards the apparent purposiveness of nature:
We may either say that it was actually designed to be beautiful by the
Supreme Force behind Nature, or we may say that purposiveness is not
really resident in nature, but that our perception of it is due to the
subjective needs of our judging faculty. We have to contemplate beautiful
objects as if they were purposive, but they may not be so in reality. And
this latter idealistic doctrine is what Kant falls back upon. 71
70 Sch6nfeld, Martin. Kant's Philosophical Development. University of Florida, 2003.
71 Kant, Immanuel. The Critique ofJudgment. Trans. J.H. Bernard. Prometheus Books: New York, 2000.
§ 43. Of Art in general, introduction by Bernard, p xxv.
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Focusing on the purposiveness that Kant ascribes to nature for the sake of cohesive
reason, these traditional interpretations override the sublimated 'work' in Kant and focus
on Opus and oeuvre making by looking at notions of 'genius', of'art' versus 'nature' and
mere 'technic'. Such a discussion is easily found in Kant. He plainly states:
(I). Art is distinguished from Nature, as doing (facere) is distinguished
from acting or working generally (Agere), and as the product or result of
the former is distinguished as work (Opus) from the working (effectus) of
the latter. 72
Herein Kanl: established a distinction between Opus and Agere, wherein Opus is
translated into French as oeuvre, or in English, masterwork or masterpiece, and connotes
for Kant, the making of 'beautiful art'. Agere is simply manual technical labor. For this
reading of Kant, production is at the heart of Opus, although the ability to produce is not
adequate to the production of an Opus as the feeling of freedom is essential in a work of
beauty:
In a product of beautiful art we must become conscious that it is Art and
not Nature; but yet the purposiveness in its form must seem to be as free
from all constraint of arbitrary rules as if it were a product of mere
nature.73
Thus far, Foucault's discussion on madness and imagination seem to qualify the mad
artist for a truly Kantian Opus, as freedom of imagination was very close to the definition
of madness for 17 th century France. Yet, Kant goes on to write:
On this feeling of freedom in the play or our cognitive faculties, which
must at the same time be purposive, rests that pleasure which alone is
universally communicable, without being based on concepts... For
whether we are dealing with natural or with artificial beauty we can say
72 Kant, Immanuel. The Critique of Judgment. Trans. J.H. Bernard. Prometheus Books: New York, 2000.
§ 43. OfArt in general, p. 183.
73 Ibid, § 45. Beautiful Art is an art, in so far as it seems like nature. p. 187.
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generally: That is beautiful which pleases in the mere act of judging it (not
in the sensation of it, or by means of a concept).7 4
Therefore, what is beautiful is a priori beautiful, existing as such without concepts, with
out sensation, without complications of culture, experience and conditioning. Yet while
Kant slips in this a priori judgment of beauty, one that everyone with taste and culture
can, will and must ascribe to by nature, the mad under Foucault's 17th century definition
are ultimately precluded from works of genius and the true creation of a true Opus: the
consensus required between the viewers of an Opus is an impossibility for those who live
in the light of unreason. Unreason is, for Foucault, a singular reasoning; it is outside
consensus by its very definition. It is a language which cannot be imitated and cannot,
therefore, go on to inspire imitation. While this is surely enough to preclude the mad
from the creation of masterworks, the genius required for their production is itself beyond
the stretch of the mad by Kant's definition:
Genius is the talent (or natural gift) which gives the rule to Art. Since
talent, as the innate productive faculty of the artist, belongs itself to
Nature, we may express the matter thus: Genius is the innate mental
disposition (ingenium) through which Nature gives the rule to Art. 75
Yet here the facile reading of 'work' in Kant, as outlined above, falls through. Shifting
from Kant's discussion of work to Kant's active definition of work reveals that in
questions of genius and beauty, Kant's law giving judge again appears to distinguish
himself from his mandates: yet this time the judge is genius itself. Kant goes on to say:
Whatever may be thought of this definition, whether it is merely arbitrary
or whether it is adequate to the concept that we are accustomed to
combine with the word genius... we can prove already beforehand that
48
74 Ibid, p 187.
7s Ibid, p 188.
according to the signification of the word here adopted, beautiful arts
must necessarily be considered as arts of genius.
The problem with our simple interpretation of 'work,' in Kant, here comes to a head as
Kant's descriptions of 'genius' and 'beautiful' double back on one another in an empty
void. The beautiful is defined in the act ofjudgment, based on an a priori concept which
is mitigated through an a priori notion of genius, yet neither a priori by definition, can be
defined by human reason. Continuing the quote above, the problem is amplified:
For every art presupposes rules by means of which in the first instance a
product, if it is to be called artistic, is represented as possible. But the
concept of beautiful art does not permit the judgment upon the beauty of a
product to be derived from any rule, which has a concept as its
determining ground, and therefore has at its basis a concept of the way in
which the product is possible. Therefore beautiful art cannot itself devise
the rule according to which it can bring about its product. But since at the
same time a product can never be called Art without some precedent rule,
Nature in the subject must (by the harmony of its faculties) give the rule to
Art; i.e., beautiful Art is only possible as a product of Genius. 76
Kant's own reasonableness has tied him into a knot, or rather a fold of voided space and
force, much like the one which Martin and Foucault's description of work and its absence
empty and fill and define. In this reading then, it is not the Critique of Judgment's
discussion of work or of Opus making that 'work' is defined by Kant. In the Critique of
Pure Reason, as a whole, Kant takes half of what Foucault will later split into reason and
madness, and inadvertently strips reason of its now hollow ability to do work, or at least,
to make work known. In the dynamic between reason and experience, the mind does the
work of judging, of categorizing, of making nature known to the viewing subject. Yet
these judgments are empty constructs, subjects without objects, yes, subjects without
objects, much like Foucault's mad and the absence of work they illustrate.
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Within the realm of 'work' outlined by Kant's own rigor in the Critique of Pure Reason,
the figure of Jacques Martin emerges in Foucault's texts. While compatriots at the Ecole
Normale Superior, Foucault was Martin's junior by four years. Though Martin started
his work at the Ecole before Foucault, two years of required civilian service in Germany
planted him back at the tIcole at the time of Foucault's first matriculation. It is here that
the absence of work first emerges from the friendship of two promising scholars and
students.
Preoccupied with the idea of madness, Martin was apparently the first to
equate madness with the absence of work ("l'absence d'oeuvre"), an
association that was taken up by both Althusser and Foucault.77
Near the end of Martin's life, both Foucault and Louis Althusser helped to support Martin
financially. Yet this quote by Eleanor Kaufman alludes to Foucault's indebtedness to
Martin as well. Moulier Boutang claims that the timing of Martin's death and Foucault's
prolific publications are uncanny; could it be that Foucault took credit for ideas that were
not his own, but Martin's? While this is a tempting and juicy hypothesis, one would have
to misread or simply slander Foucault to make such a point. Yet the question remains:
what was the textual impact of this friendship between Martin and Foucault? In
response, I propose a serious view of their relationship in light of its silence and its
playfulness. As this playfulness is best illustrated in one of Foucault's most loudly silent
texts on Jacques Martin, titled, "Madness, the Absence of Work," let us turn there next.7 8
77 Ibid, p 62.
78 Foucault, Michel. "Madness, the Absence of Work," Foucault and His Interlocutors. Ed. Arnold I.
Davidson, University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1997. p 97-104.
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"Madness, the Absence of Work" though written long after Madness and Civilization is
at once the prologue and the preface to Foucault's bodies of work on madness as they
emerged from his friendship with Jacques Martin. Though silently included in Foucault's
projections of a future where madness no longer threatens civilization, "Madness, the
Absence of Work," is also the story of Martin's life and illness as witnessed by his friend
Michel Foucault. Over the course of their friendship, Martin's schizophrenia rendered
him incapable of reason. This occurred not only through the physical degeneration
instigated by the disease 'schizophrenia', but also, according to Foucault, by definition of
the very disease itself Martin found his own work doubling back onto itself in a process
that repeated only constant contradiction, and ultimately, negation. Ultimately, though
one of the first to translate Hegel from German to French, the mentor of Louis Althusser
and compatriot of Michel Foucault's, Martin could not distinguish his mad thoughts from
his reasonable ones. In truth, Martin, the linguist, scholar and one of the cole
Normale's top students, could not control his mind. Thus a chaotic pairing of mad and
sane ideas emerged in Martin's person and thoughts; yet without the ability to distinguish
between them, the value and contributions of both were lost to Martin, lost to the tcole
and lost to history. In one of Martin's final acts of self-destruction, he destroyed all the
work he had produced. Hollow, empty, indistinguishable from the voices of unreason,
the oeuvre of a near-genius entered the hollow void of nothing from whence all his
thoughts always and never came. Without ever explicitly saying so, "Madness, the
Absence of Work" is made up from headlines of what was/is/would have been Martin's
life story.
51
To begin with "Madness, the Absence of Work", Foucault projects to an age where
perhaps, "...we will no longer now what madness was."79 In a time such as this, Martin
as genius and Martin as madman would not be contradictory statements, but the
description of a subject in his fullness. Foucault writes on the distinction between
madness and sanity:
Only the enigma of this exteriority will remain. What was, then, this
strange demarcation, one will ask, that was at work from the heart of the
Middle Ages until the twentieth century and possibly beyond? Why did
Western culture cast from its field that in which it might just as well have
recognized itself, where in fact it had recognized itself obliquely? Why has
it formulated so clearly since the nineteenth century, but in a way already
since the classical age, that madness was the truth of the human laid bare
while nevertheless placing it in a space, neutralized and pale, where it was
as it were canceled?8 0
This strange demarcation of madness against reason, the folding over of reason onto
madness and madness onto reason, these distinctions will and have withered for Foucault,
but not yet for all of civilization, which still plays in the realm of reason's tricks and
contrivances:
So the sharp image of reason will wither inflames. The familiar game of
mirroring the other side of ourselves in madness and of eavesdropping
from our listening posts on voices that, coming from very far, tell us more
nearly what we are - this game with its rules, its strategies, its
contrivances, its tricks, its tolerated illegalities will once andfor all have
become nothing but a complex ritual whose significations will have been
reduced to ashes.8 '
79 Ibid., Aware that the urge to medicate might be seen as the fulfillment of Foucault's futuristic vision, he
quickly reminds his readers that silence by pharmaceuticals is scarcely more than another version of 1 7th
century confinement.
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While Martin was faced with 'the other side of [himself] in madness', he was himself,
also reduced to ashes in the tumbling of reason onto itself in his person. Yet, as long as
the refusal of reason's unreasonableness persists, the juxtaposition of terms such reason,
unreason, object and subject will persist in all their unrecognized madness. Most of
philosophy will be called to account for this split. As discourses, as dialectics which fold
back on themselves these opposed terms become involved in the formation of a void and
its reserve which for future generations, Foucault writes, will be clear signposts of our
time: markers of our fear and proximity to madness itself.
Anticipating the Prozac era we now participate in due to both our fear and proximity to
madness, Foucault writes that the medicating of madness is not enough to break this
constant folding in on itself of reason and unreason.
To say that madness is disappearing today means that its implication both
in psychiatric knowledge and thought of an anthropological kind is
coming undone. But this is not to say that the general form of
transgression, whose visible face madness has been for centuries, is also
disappearing. Nor does it mean that this transgression is not giving rise
to a new experience even as we are asking ourselves what madness is.82
As we begin to ask ourselves what madness is now, what obtains, even in our Prozac age,
are strict prohibitions on language which gag and bind the madness/reason distinction
before it can be spoken.
That which will not take long to die, that which is already dying in us (and
whose very death bears our current language) is homo dilecticus-the
being of departure, of return, and of time; the animal that loses its truth
only in order to find it again, illuminated; the self-estranged who once
again recovers the unity of the self-same. This figure has been the master
subject and the object slave of all the discourses concerning the human, in
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particular human alienation which have persisted for quite some time.
Andfortunately it is dying beneath the babble of these discourses. 83
Foucault then points to a time that is coming, where in mad literature such as that of
Artaud is recognized as a simple sign of our era, not a breach in its thinking. This would
be the case for the life of Martin as well; the implication being that if madness could
enter its proper discourse, that of reason, the fullness of these two forms echoing back on
one another would collapse the dichotomies that philosophy has long argued over.
Foucault is not alone in this thinking. Althusser, in his early work on Marx and Lenin,
seems to echo very similar thoughts. Althusser attributes to Lenin the ability to rise over
and through the top of meaningless and long argued dialectics via movement, via action.
While Althusser's relationship to this call is complex, as we shall see in a later chapter,
the sharing of this concept may take place in the tripartite friendship each man had with
Jacques Martin. Whether influenced by Martin, by one another, or by their historical
period, Foucault and Althusser share a reflection on action and language and their
subsequent prohibitions in Western History. According to Foucault's text, Western
History:
... has long occupied an indeterminate area, difficult for us to specify,
between the prohibition directed at action and that directed at language.
Hence the exemplary importance of the pair furor-inanitas, which had
practically organized the world of madness along the registers of deed
and word up to the end of the Renaissance... Classical confinement
envelopes, along with madness, the libertinism of thought and of speech,
the obstinacy within impiety or heterodoxy, blasphemy, sorcery, alchemy -
in short everything that characterizes the spoken and forbidden world of
unreason; madness is language that is excluded..84
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Here the work of Sigmund Freud and psychoanalysis plays an essential role in our
investigation of work and its absence. If madness is, according to Foucault, 'language
that is excluded' Freud's attempts to deal with everyday madness would seemingly pose
further questions for Foucault. In a time when Freud's methods and techniques became
household words, this 'exclusion,' in light of Freud, needs further definition. This
definition comes in the subject of work, and particularly Freud's method of 'working-
through'.
The concept and procedure of working-through was highlighted by Sigmund Freud's
1914 article: "Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through (Further
Recommendations on the Technique of Psychoanalysis II)," in which Freud describes the
progressive improvements that the practice of Psychoanalysis has undergone since its
conception. While enabling the analysand to remember traumatic events and their
surrounding circumstances was once sufficient, 1914 practice now recognized that the
seemingly 'forgotten' memory was never truly forgotten. In a process known as acting-
out, the analysand replayed and repeated the initial trauma in a sometimes unrelated
behavior.
He reproduces it not as a memory but as an action; he repeats it, without,
of course, knowing that he is repeating it... For instance, the patient does
not say that he remembers that he used to be defiant and critical towards
his parents' authority; instead, he behaves in that way to the doctor. He
does not remember how he came to a helpless and hopeless deadlock in
his infantile sexual researches; but he produces a mass of confused
dreams and associations, complains that he cannot succeed in anything
and asserts that he is fated never to carry through what he undertakes.8 5
85 Freud, Sigmund. "Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through (Further Recommendations on the
Technique of Psychoanalysis II)." The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud Volume 12, p
150.
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And this process of acting-out (defined as repetition through transference) describes, for
Freud, the initial stage of working-through a traumatic event via the procedures of
psychoanalysis. The second phase comes in not only allowing this acting-out to occur
but in encouraging it to do so in a transference from analysand to analyst:
We render the compulsion harmless, and indeed useful, by giving it the
right to assert itself in a definite field. We admit it into the transference as
a playground in which it is allowed to expand in almost complete freedom
and in which it is expected to display to us everything in the way of
pathogenic instincts that is hidden in thepatients' mind.86
By giving the compulsion to repeat a playground of sorts, the repetition now finds a new
home in the transference, where it is treated as a curable pseudo-illness. By removing
resistances to the analysand's compulsion, the compulsion is played out and the memory
below the repetition is free to rise to the surface. Again, working-through occurs as the
analyst and analysand address and free compulsions and their resistances.
What does this work have to do with Foucault and Martin's formulations? That question
is not simply answered, but perhaps the 'work' which takes place in working-through
allows us at least one response. Like the work that occurs in the gap between subject and
object in Kant's formation, working-through, according to Freud, is a work that takes
place between reality and illness87. When the analysand's resistance is at its height, when
the gap between his compulsion and reality come together in the acting-out of
transference, Freud relies on rational storytelling to evoke past memories, address them
as trauma in order to replace consequent repressions and their symptomatic repetitions.
This coherent, linear storytelling comes, again, very close to Descartes' work; that of
86 Ibid, p 154.
87 Ibid. 152.
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lining up what is known with what is rational. But somehow, this time around,
Descartes' error is Freud's virtue - naturally the work of psychoanalysis is to separate
madness from rationality. The work of the analysand is precisely this process of
separating, blocking internal resistances, separating again... but where does this leave us
in regard to the absence of work if the separation between madness and rationality is a
false one?
In Freud's 1915 piece titled "Mourning and Melancholia" the economics of work,
psychoanalytic work, conclude, prior to Foucault and with less clarity, that madness and
reason can be one and the same. This conclusion arises in the process of comparing
mourning and melancholia, as Freud seeks to derive the abnormal origin of melancholia
from the normal processes of grief and mourning. One of Freud's most enduring process
definitions of mourning is as follows:
Mourning originates under the influence of reality testing, which demands
categorically that one must part from the object because the object no
longer exists. Now it is the task of mourning to carry out this retreat from
the object in all situations in which the object was the recipient of an
intense cathexis. The painful character of this separation accords with the
explanation just given - that is, it is explained by the intense and
unrealizable longingful cathexis of the object during the reproduction of
the situations in which the tie to the object has to be dissolved8 .
Using Freud's definition, we see that in the customary act or task of mourning, the
mourning subject heals, over time, through the work of what Freud calls 'reality testing',
i.e.: affirming the absence of the lost object while systematically de-cathecting through
88 Sigmund Freud, The Problem of Anxiety. Chapter 11
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the work of memory. Melancholia, however, takes mourning through a covert, yet often
violently different mourning process:
Melancholia, or more accurately the melancholic attack: In this disease,
about whose causes and mechanism we know far too little, the most
remarkable characteristic is the way in which the superego - you may call
it, but in a whisper, the conscience - treats the ego. The melancholic
during periods of health can, like any one else, be more or less severe
towards himself; but when he has a melancholic attack, his superego
becomes over-severe, abuses, humiliates, and ill-treats his unfortunate
ego, threatens it with the severest punishments, reproaches it for long
forgotten actions which were at the time regarded quite lightly, and
behaves as though it had spent the whole interval in amazing complaint
and was only waiting for its present increase in strength to bring them
forward, and to condemn the ego on their account. The super-ego has the
ego at its mercy and applies the most severe moral standards to it... after
a certain number of months the whole moralfuss is at an end, the critical
voice of the super-ego is silent, the ego is reinstated, and enjoys once
more all the rights of man until the next attack89 .
Throughout the violence described by Freud above, the ego goes to work on two fronts.
The first of these fronts works in the unconscious, while the second task of work occurs
as the ego masquerades a fragile, 'normal,' facade of mourning. In "Mourning and
Melancholia," Freud states that in the unconscious work of the melancholic subject, the
subject-libido refuses to disconnect from the lost-object due to an ambivalence on the
part of the subject, in regard to the lost-object itself. While this ambivalence results from
repressed anger toward the object, the subject sadistically turns this anger onto its own
ego, living out the very act or acts which angered the subject in the first place and
castigating itself for the causes of its own ambivalence toward the lost object. This entire
melancholic process is masked: only the work of a mourner is seen on the surface of a
violent unconscious ego castigation.
89 Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. Chapter 3
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In mourning we found that the inhibition and loss of interest are fully
accountedfor by the work of mourning in which the ego is absorbed. In
melancholia, the unknown loss will result in a similar internal work and
will therefore be responsible for the melancholic inhibition. The
difference is that the inhibition of the melancholic seems puzzling to us
because we cannot see what it is that is absorbing him so entirely. The
melancholic displays something else besides which is lacing in mourning -
an extraordinary diminution of his self-regard, an impoverishment of his
ego on a grand scale. In mourning it is the world which has become poor
and empty; in melancholia it is the ego itself 90
What is revealed on the surface of melancholia, which is distinct from mourning are
professions of self-degradation on the part of the subject. It is in these reprimands that
the cross-over between madness and reason is sighted in Freud:
When in his heightened self-criticism he [the subject] describes himself as
petty, egoistic, dishonest, lacking in independence, one whose sole aim has
been to hide the weaknesses of his own nature, it may be, so far as we
know, that he has come pretty near to understanding himself; we only
wonder why a man has to be ill before he can be accessible to a truth of
this kind. For there can be no doubt that if anyone holds and expresses to
others and opinion of himselfsuch as this (an opinion which Hamlet held
both of himself and of everyone else) he is ill, whether he is speaking the
truth or whether he is being more or less unfair to himself:91
As Freud points out, it is in illness, in madness that the analysand speaks most accurately
about himself. Yet as Freud points out, this self-understanding requires 'illness,' or as
Foucault later attests, it requires a folding of madness and reason in order that one might
see the fullness of himself if the absence of that reason, in the absence of that work.
While the work of melancholia works to appear as the work of mourning, yet a third task
of work emerges in the position of the analyst: which work is he to work with? If the
90 Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia", The Standard Edition of Complete Psychological Works of
Sigmund Freud, Volume XIV. Trans. Stachey, James. London: Hogarth Press, 1957. p 246.
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grieving subject is in fact mourning, then, as Freud points out, no treatment is required.
Yet if melancholia is masquerading as mourning, then it is the analysts' task to uncover
that unconscious work so that it might be properly analyzed and properly treated. Should
the analyst mistake the work of mourning for that of melancholia, the degree of trauma
that melancholic treatment would induce is severe. Yet if melancholia works so well in
its masquerade as to convince the analyst of its false truth, the success of this mask may
lead to the eventual suicide of a patient whose ambivalence toward its own ego may
supersede this ego's desire to live. Freud claims:
In melancholia the relation to the object is no simple one; it is
complicated by the conflict due to ambivalence... In melancholia,
accordingly, countless separate struggles are carried on over the object,
in which hate and love contend with each other; the one seeks to detach
the libido from the object, the other to maintain this position of the libido
against the assault. In mourning too, the efforts to detach the libido are
made in this same system; but in it nothing hinders these processes form
proceeding along the normal path... This path is blockedfor the work of
melancholia... So by takingflight into the ego love escapes extinction.
If Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak claims that Freud's work is an attempt to revisit Kant, it is
in passages like these from Freud's work that such claims appear justified. The work
described in Kant as the process by which the subject seeks to know objects as such,
appears here in Freud's melancholia in the subject of the ego that will not let go of its
ideal, and has narcissistically cathected itself to a reality it cannot access. This love - an
ambivalent narcissistic desire for the reality of the other in itself, this madness, described
here by Freud, is the madness of the classical age, of modernity, of Foucault's uncovering
and Martin's possession: it is work and it is work's absence, appear and dissolving
again... and again... and again.
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In light of Freud's work on work, Foucault reiterates a modem understanding of madness
which still struggles in the border between shadow and light, as it did in 17th century
terms. Yet now, Freud's procedures have increased the amount of folding which the
prohibition against speaking the truth of madness necessitates:
Therefore Freud's work ought to be taken for what it is; it does not
discover that madness is apprehended in a web of significations it shares
with everyday language, thereby granting the license to speak of it in the
common platitudes ofpsychological vocabulary. 92
In other words, Freud does not give voice to the silent. Instead, he:
...dislodges the European experience of madness in order to situate it in
this perilous region, still transgressive (therefore still forbidden but in a
rather peculiar fashion), which is the region of languages that implicate
themselves; that is to say, they enunciate in their utterances the linguistic
code in which they enunciate those utterances. 93
Freud, like Foucault is simply illuminating the mechanisms by which madness is known.
And therefore;
Freud did not discover the lost identity of a meaning; he carved out the
disruptive image of a signifier that is absolutely not like the others.
...And, for the same reason, madness has appeared not like the ruse of a
hidden signification but like a prodigious reserve of meaning.9 4
This "signifier that is absolutely not like the others" echoes back to Foucault's own
definition of madness in civilization: it is reason that marches to its own drum. It is a
signification with a myriad of references, referents, and signs - none of which claim any
more or any less being than any others. It is a reasonableness that negates reason. It is
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the life of Jacques Martin as it creases, covers, doubles and blinds its own production in
the process of its own negation. As Foucault claims9 5:
Since Freud, Western madness has become a nonlanguage as it turned
into a double language (a linguistic code that does not exist except in this
utterance, an utterance that does not say anything other than its linguistic
code) - that is to say, a matrix of a language that, in a strict sense, does
not say anything. A fold of the spoken that is an absence of work.96
Here, finally, we draw close to the meaning of an absence of work in Foucault, both as it
is exemplified in his text and as it is exemplified in Martin and in his madness. 'The fold
of the spoken' is also the fold of the written, the fold of the thought, the fold of work
itself, which becomes un-work. By definition it is this false distinction between reason
and unreason that is the heart of Foucault's argument, and as he claims, is the involuted
basis on which civilization both builds and simultaneously destroys itself, just as Kant's
Critiques destroyed themselves in their 'working' definition. The absence of work
therefore, is not a system of seeing the work of an author as a whole or as fragmentation,
it is not a system of understanding Foucault's own literature or life's works. Foucault
scholars such as Shoshana Felman and Jacob Fischer have looked at Foucault's
description of the absence of work, or as Felman translates it: 'unaccomplishment at
work' as a key to Foucault's work as an oeuvre in itself. Whether or not one agrees with
Foucault's definition of madness as absence of work, such mismatched applications of
l'absence d'oeuvre as methods to define method are like those that strive to show that
Hegel's concept of the dialectic is also his style of writing, or his method of constructing
95 Foucault writes: And, for the same reason, madness has appeared not like the ruse of a hidden
signifaction but like a prodigious reserve of meaning. We still have to grasp how fitting this word reserve
is. Much more than a mere supply, it is afigure that retains and suspends meaning, laying out an
emptiness where nothing is proposed but the yet-incomplete possibility that some meaning or another may
come to lodge there, or still a third, and this may perhaps continue to infinity. Ibid.
96 Ibid.
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his own archive. Such miscontruals miss the force of Foucault's argument and the impact
of Martin's life, not to mention the implications Kant's own absence of work had on
Foucault's ideas and writings. The absence of work is not the method by which Foucault
wrote his books, it is, he claims, the silent method by which all books are written and all
lives lived.
Thankfully, not all readings of l'absence d'oeuvre are attempts to aestheticize Foucault's
method. Eleanor Kaufman describes absence of work "as unnamable as repetition.9 7"
Madness opens up a lacunar reserve that designates and exposes that
chasm where linguistic code and utterance become entangled, shaping
each other and speaking of nothing but their still silent rapport.
This 'lacunar reserve' is alluded to throughout "Madness, the Absence of Work," and
plays a significant role in Foucault's definition of madness itself. In the doubling into
nothing which is madness, a void, or as Foucault says, a reserve is recognized. The term
reserve was already evoked in prior readings of Kant's theories of Work, particularly in
the writings of one Foucault's strongest most silent influences: Martin Heidegger.
Therefore, to complete our discussion on work and its absence, it is worth a brief turn to
Heidegger's concept of reserve in order to better understand and fill out its meaning in
the writings of Foucault.
In 1953, Martin Heidegger looked at Kant's distinction between work and Work, between
technical production and the making of an oeuvre and reformulated Kant's thinking using
technology as a turning point. While the social implications of Heidegger's writings are
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at least highly questionable, his influence over Michel Foucault is strongly reflected in
Foucault's own reading of Kant on the question of work, of genius, of production as a
voiding reserve and of the absence of the production as a doubling back of that same
void. "The Question Concerning Technology"9 8 is one of four lectures that Heidegger
delivered to the Bremen Club in 1953. In this startling essay Heidegger examined future
technology-based societies, looking for what, in essence, technology is. Heidegger's
work concerning technology is in fact, according to Wolfgang Schirmacher, the study of
a metaphor. If the modern period represents the end of metaphysics:
...post-modernism is simply a metaphorical expression of this end, after
which there will be no new beginning ...Heidegger's thinking is still
fascinated by technology as an 'unassailable substitute for metaphysics'
(Heidegger, 1976).9 9
Fascinated, as Schirmacher purports, by technology as metaphysics' replacement,
Heidegger then searches for the technology's foundation and finds that it, in essence, is
not technological. What technology is Heidegger states, is a presencing forth and a
revealing:
What is modem technology? It too is a revealing. Only when we allow
our attention to rest on this fundamental characteristic does that which is
new in modern technology show itself to us.I00
Having established the fundamental characteristic of technology as something other than
technological, Heidegger presses on toward the implications of what this essence means
and what it does in the world, stating:
98 Heidegger, Martin. "The Question Concerning Technology," Basic Writings. Harper & Row,
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99 Schirmacher, Wolfgang. "The End of Metaphysics - What does this mean?" Social Science
Information, 23 (3) 1984.
100 Heidegger, Martin. (1953), 1977.
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...the revealing that holds sway throughout modern technology does not
unfold into a bringing-forth in the sense of poiEsis. The revealing that
rules in modern technology is a challenging, [Herausfordern], which puts
to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be
extracted and stored as such. 10'
Exemplifying this claim to technology as challenging-forth, Heidegger asks his listeners
to consider the Rhine River. Once a hydro-electric plant is set upon the Rhine, the river
is no longer what it was before. With the import of technology in the form of the hydro-
electric plant, the river now becomes a "water-power supplier, [and] derives its essence
from the power station."'02 This conception of technology, as a challenging forth of
nature into a position of submission and supply is ultimately, according to Heidegger, the
challenging of nature and human kind. And while technology is dictating the role of
humankind, we are yet deceived into thinking that we are in control of technology. 103 Is
it possible that reason, in Foucault, plays a very similar an equally deceptive role?
The coming to presence of technology threatens revealing, threatens it
with the possibility that all revealing will be consumed in ordering and
that everything will present itself only in the unconcealedness of standing-
reserve. Human activity can never directly counter this danger. Human
achievement alone can never banish it. But human reflection can ponder
the fact that all saving power must be of a higher essence than what is
endangered, though at the same time, kindred to it.104
Therefore, Heidegger's conception of the world as a supply base for technology is not
without hope. In the final words of this "Question Concerning Technology," Heidegger
'101' Ibid. (1953) 1977.
}02 Ibid. (1953) 1977.
103 Lest this sound like a conspiracy theory, it only takes a moments reflection to note how dependant on
technology the western world, at least, has become. Whether or not one believes that this dependency
constitutes a fundamental shift in our essence, as Heidegger purports, is certainly up for debate.
Nonetheless, if we consider the writings of Adorno, in "Enlightenment as Mass Deception," Heidegger's
claims concerning the control of technology over nature and humankind may seem less extreme.
104 Ibid. (1953) 1977.
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holds that art and the domain of artistic production was once akin to technology through
their origins in the Greek word techne, meaning 'the art of bringing forth':
There was once a time when it was not technology alone that bore the
name technE... Once there was a time when the bringing-forth of the true
into the beautiful was called techna. The poiEsis of the fine arts was also
called techna.
This 'once upon a time' to which Heidegger refers echoes in the words of Kant. The
technis of work, simple reasonable work in Kant is not far from Heidegger's techni. And
for Foucault, the deep threatened unconcealedness may be the region where madness and
reason mirror one another completely. Where technology cannot be distinguished from a
masterwork, where a woman of glass shares her thoughts with Nobel Laureates. The
dichotomies that Heidegger evokes as he tries to work his way through and out of
metaphysics are mirrored in the Foucault's delineation of his efforts to dig up the bones
of metaphysics' and reason's influence on thought in history. Therefore, the reserve for
Foucault, and the unconcealedness for Heidegger, are the space from which work and its
absence circle forth in history, in the reason/madness couple, and as shown above, in the
life and symbolism that was Jacques Martin.
It has been alluded to by Magritte and others that often it is the vast amount of nothing
that is the creation of a work in itself. For Foucault, all that Martin destroyed he also
created, leaving both a body of work and a person himself that is both absent and all the
more poignant and present in the state of his missing. Yet after Heidegger, after Kant,
and after work, the easy question still remains: Why doesn't Foucault speak Martin's
name? Is his silence a doubling as well? But perhaps the more difficult answer comes
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from Foucault himself, who best speaks to his own silence in a way that incorporates
(incriminates?) Althusser and Martin as well:
The history of systems of thought is neither the history of men nor that of
the men who think them. Ultimately, it is because it remains trapped in
the terms of that alternative that the conflict between materialism and
spiritualism is one between fraternal enemies... one takes as the subject of
thought either individuals or groups, but they are still subjects... The
abandonment of dualism and the constitution of a non-Cartesian subject
demands more: eliminating the subject, but keeping thoughts; and
attempting to construct a history with no human nature. 5
Foucault's project was not to write biographies. He dug up the structures that produced
producers of biographies. Both Foucault and Althusser clearly shared with Martin
complex notions of subjectivity and an ambivalence toward personal idea attribution and
fixed definitions in both biographical and autobiographical style. It may be for this
reason that Martin remains at once revealed and deeply hidden within the work of his
friend Foucault. Or, it may be that Martin is not hidden in Foucault at all, but acted out in
a life-long process of working-through. This possibility leads us to a final discussion on
Freud before we can begin to finish the work started herein.
While Moulier Boutang claims it was Martin's failure that both Foucault and Althusser
saw over their shoulders through life, and Kaufman claims that it was actually Martin's
genius they hoped to fulfill, perhaps the story is more elusive and at once, more involved
than either of these claims acknowledge. Is it not, in fact, Moulier Boutang, Eleanor
Kaufman, myself and a possible handful of others who are expanding the silences of
Foucault, Althusser and Martin? Perhaps presumptive histories such as ours cannot be
105 Macey, David, The Lives of Michel Foucault. p. 235. This quote comes from Foucault's successful
proposal to the College de France, reviewed on the 30t h of November, 1969.
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written without first acknowledging that it is our own hands, our own keyboards and our
own scripts which speak in excess of particular and invented Martins, Althussers and
Foucaults: while the rest of the tome of these men's lives remains circling, collapsing and
reviving themselves in the reserve of reason and madness in the absence of work.
"Once uncovered as a language silenced by its superposition upon itself,
madness neither manifests nor narrates the birth of a work ( or of
something which, by genius or by change, could have become a work); it
outlines an empty form from where this work comes, in other words, the
place from where it never ceases to be absent, where it will never by found
because it had never been located there to begin with. There in that pale
region, in that essential hiding place, the twinlike incompatibility of the
work and of madness become unveiled; this is the blind spot of the
possibility of each to become the other and of their mutual exclusion. ,,106
106 Foucault, "Madness, the Absence of Work" . p 104
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Chapter 4
Attempts are often made to compare and contrast the work of two scholars by looking for
points of union and points of disjuncture. The temptation to align the ideas of Foucault
and Althusser is pressing as both men students of Bachelard, both were trained at the
Ecole Normale, both were friends and colleagues of Jacques Martin, both made their
careers in thoughts now classified as post-structuralist, and both men were absent in the
pivotal and almost revolutionary events of May 1968... Before I have begun to stake a
claim for avoiding such a side by side comparison, I have been caught in the process by
the same deceptive interest in storytelling that plagues this thesis as a whole. Althusser
described this comparative process well in a 'thank you' to his friend and mentor, Jean
Guitton:
'You have taught me how to enter into contact with a concept, with two; to
combine them, oppose the, unite them, untie them, to toss them like a
pancake on a frying pan and then serve them so that they are edible.'1 07
Whether the process of frying was conscious or not, Althusser remained true to his above
described procedure in his analysis of Marx. Mixing his experiences as a Catholic Youth
and what would grow into a full body of Marxist critiques, at least one of Althusser's
most famous concepts, that of the 'break' in Marx's own writing, may have direct
connections to the break between the Old and New Testament, as outlined by the
Church's best theology. 'Serving up something edible', in this case, brought Althusser
out of obscurity to prominence, albeit rebellion of a sort, within the French Communist
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107 Webster, Paul. 1988.
Party (PCF). But this prominence was dashed when Althusser failed to mix theory and
action. Or, rather, when his theory was one of inaction, as we will see below.
I will now trap myself in the compare and contrast mode that I am trying to avoid when I
say that Foucault did not adhere to Althusser's idealism. Leary of 'concepts' in general
Foucault spent quite a pages of his work illustrating just how a process like Althusser's
might come about.
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, during the period that has
been termed, rightly or wrongly, the Baroque, thought ceases to move in
the element of resemblance... We alreadyfind a critique of resemblance in
Bacon... He shows them, shimmering before our eyes, vanishing as one
draws near, then re-forming again a moment later, a little further off:
They are idols. 108
Idolatry, worshipping false gods, is the everyday practice of classical thinking, according
to Foucault.
The relation of the sign to the signified now resides in a space in which
there is no longer any intermediary figure to connect them: what connects
them is a bond established, inside knowledge, between the idea of one
thing and the idea of another. 109
So perhaps I am being to hard to criticize Althusser for an act that I, as part of the
classical heritage Foucault describes, cannot avoid myself. Nonetheless, with something
of Foucault's license for error, in this chapter I would like to look at Foucault, Althusser
and when appropriate, Jacques Martin's work as one would look at separate paintings in a
joint exhibition: not as similarities and differences, but as works with crossing and
intersecting interests of their own. From their time at the Pcole Normale, to Foucault and
108 Foucault, Michel. The Order of Things. Random House, Inc.: New York, 1970, p 51.
109 Ibid, p 63.
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Althusser's individual absences during one of the most influential political upheavals of
their time, the May 1968 revolts, I hope to set these men side by side without implication.
My hope is that by avoiding direct processes of comparison and contrast, questionably
equal to the process of knowledge production, this chapter will create multiple contexts
of collective works in the times and writings of Michel Foucault and Louis Althusser.
'Off Althusser est-il?':
'Where is Althusser?' was both a chorus chanted through the streets May 6 th, 1968 and a
profound statement of self doubt: Louis Althusser's life and career were both marked by
a willingness to revisit, revise and shift his own positions. Though it may have been a
joke, or a test, Althusser was known in the halls of the Ecole Normale as the professor
who stopped students just to ask them: "Who am I?" Yet within Althusser's individual
writings, questions such as 'where is he?' and 'who am I?' rarely arise. His style is clear,
legible, questioning and challenging. He repeats the difficult points in order to help his
audience understand the intent, even if he may radically change his own ideas from one
work to the next. This same clear yet shifting style goes for his biography as well. A
good student., he did his best to please his teachers as he did his best to enter the Ecole
Normale and to please his Heavenly Father: Althusser was a fervent catholic before he
was a fervent Marxist... devotion spilled from a desire to know, to change, to belong...
to belong.
Althusser's collective experiences began in the Catholic Church, but his search for a
father figure began just after his birth. Maybe 'father figure' is not precise; Althusser
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says of himself that he was looking for acceptance, he was looking for meaning, he was
looking for his own individual self:
When I was born, I was christened Louis. I know it only too well... Above
all, it contained the sound of the third person pronoun ('lui'), which
deprived me of any personality of my own, summoning as it did an
anonymous other. It referred to my uncle, the man who stood behind me:
'Lui' was Louis. It was him my mother loved, not me."'0
Althusser's mother, Lucienne Berger, was from childhood betrothed to a kindred spirit in
Louis' uncle, the other Louis Althusser.111 When Louis was killed over Verdun, his older
brother, Charles, proposed to Lucienne so that he might take care of Lucienne in Louis'
stead. The result was a devastating match, both for Lucienne, and for her first son. 1 2
Both in [my mother's] presence and away from her, I always had the
feeling that I did not exist in orfor myself... I always felt there had been a
mistake, and that it was not really me she loved or was even looking at...
When she looked at me, it was not me she saw, but another person, the
other Louis, who was not me... He stood behind me, in some infinite and
imaginary sky which was for ever marked by his death. It was as if she
looked through me. I disappeared under her gaze...13
Althusser sought, throughout his life, to both escape out of and into personal invisibility.
As a boy, Louis Althusser got involved with the Catholic Youth Movement and his early
writings reflect a fervent interest to remake the Church, and particularly its language, in
110 The larger quote, found in Althusser, Louis. The Future Lasts Forever, reads: When I was born, I was
christened Louis. I know it only too well. For a long time, Louis was a name I literally detested. It was
too short, had only one vowel and ended in the sharp 'ee' sound which offended me (bear this in mind when
I later come on to myfantasy of the stake). Doubtless it also saidyes a little too readily on my behalf, and I
rebelled against this 'yes' which corresponded to my mother's desire rather than to mine. Above all, it
contained the sound of the third person pronoun ('lui '), which deprived me of any personality of my own,
summoning as it did an anonymous other. It referred to my uncle, the man who stood behind me: 'Lui' was
Louis. It was him my mother loved, not me. p. 39
1 "On a Sunday the Althussers would sometimes 'go up' to the forestry house and, as their respective
children were growing up and relatively well matched in age... the parents agreed they should marry. I do
not know why, but Louis, the younger boy, was paired with Lucienne, and Charles, the elder with Juliette.
In fact I know quite well; it was because their natural affinity was obvious from the start." Ibid, p 35.
112 Ibid, in Chapters 3 and 4, Althusser describes Lucienne's unhappiness, her disgust for all things sexual,
and her continued love for the deceased Louis.
113 Ibid, p 53.
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order to reach out to those who were not within the fold. As a young proselytizer,
Althusser first engaged in a process by which he would later be well known: he became
the rebel son of Catholic Youth Movement, not by action or by violence, but through
strong and often scorching critique that somehow always remained faithful to the cause,
even while questioning its very existence. This pattern of internal criticism would follow
Althusser into the French Communist Party (PCF), a move that no one but his future
wife, Helene Lgotien, and his close friend, Jacques Martin, could have predicted.
Like Jacques Martin and countless other young French men of the time, Althusser's
entrance to the Ecole Normale was interrupted by national service duties. Yet, whereas
Martin was called to work in Germany, Althusser was called for French military service.
Much to his happiness, Althusser never saw battle. Instead, his brigade was taken
hostage by the Germans and held in a prison camp for five years which Althusser
describes as some of the best of his life. Among 'real working men', who must have
reminded him of his grandfather's salt-of-the-earth Algerian workers and his boy scout
compatriots, Althusser claims he first learned how to masturbate, speak German and
resist even his own attempts to escape imprisonment. Althusser also recalls that he met
his first Marxist in that camp, though a friend who passed through the same confines later
recalled that when he spoke of the communists and Marx's writings, Althusser showed
absolutely no interest or knowledge of the subjects at hand.
Upon Althusser's return to Paris however, he did show considerable, if not coy, interest
in an older Jewish girl named Hlene Rytman who had fought in the resistance and was
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known as Helene L6gotien.14 A radical former militant communist, Hl6ne was out of
standing with the PCF by the time she met Althusser, though she ached to be reaccepted
and pined for the rights of the working proletariat. The stories about Althusser's
relationship with Ms. Lgotien are not often pretty. Described as a controlling editor of
Althusser's work, a possessive, isolating and brooding girlfriend by Althusser's friends,
Althusser himself describes Hlene as a patient melancholic who would no more
influence his work than the work of President de Gaulle. She had conflicts with Jacques
Martin as well. While at the Ecole normale, Martin lived at 7 Rue D'Ulm strategically
situated next door to Althusser and Helene in #6. Initially, the situation between Hlene
and Martin was rivalrous. Both were fighting for the sole attention of Althusser, though
it is unknown whether or not Martin ever truly fell for Althusser. Eventually, however,
Martin was "admis comme un member de la famille, comme le petit frbre qui a toujour
des ennuis.115" He translated Hegel and then Marx, and while he sold these translations it
is implied that he undertook them for Althusser's benefit. Martin's influence on
Althusser's Marxism was immense, yet his interest in Communism is almost always
attributed to the influence of Hlene. 116
It is then sometime around 1945 and the end of the war that Althusser begins to shift
from an aspiring Catholic theologian and philosopher to a Marxist exegete. Althusser's
114 Hlene's original last name was Rytman, which she changed to Lgotien before meeting Althusser.
115 Moulier-Boutang, Yann. Louis Althusser. P 456. In English: [He was] "admitted like a member of the
family, like a little brother who was always in troubles/worries."
116 One of Althusser's life long friends and Catholic mentors, Jean Guitton noted the origin of Helene's
influence as follows: "Althusser's Marxist thinking appears to have been dominated by Helene's hatred of
the French Communist Party's 'bourgeois Marxism'. Althusser 'wanted to take Marxism to its absolute, that
is to mysticism,' Guitton says, while revealing that his former pupil never came to terms with his loss of
Christian faith. He told the Catholic writer: 'I do not know what caused it. Perhaps I am like the man whom
Oscar Wilde spoke of who, being obliged to teach the perfect knowledge of God, lost the perfect love of
God."' Webster, Paul. "Paris Diary: Victim of a Broken Mind" The Guardian, Oct. 8, 1988.
74
final thesis fbr the Ecole Normale on Hegel reflects this shift: it is one of the early and
telling writings of the man who would later formulate a split in the works of Marx that, I
believe, mirrors the bisection of the Bible between the Old and the New Testaments. The
following quotation, though lengthy, is revealing in its language, tone and desire to
illustrate Catholic theology in Marxist terms. It is also a critical and unique discourse on
'work' in both Catholicism and Marxism, which is necessary to our quest for
understanding the nature and absence of 'work' in Althusser and the broader collective
scene of his times. Althusser begins this discussion on work through a discussion of its
alienation as follows:
"The; plunge of the product into Nature, which occurs as soon as the
product escapes the producer's control and is no longer posited as being
identical with him, gives us a better grasp of the creation myth. On the
purest conception, God is the circularity of Love; he is sufficient unto
himself and has no outside. The creation is literally a rupture in this
circularity: God does not need the creation, so that it is, by definition,
different from him. This non-identity of the Creator and his creature is the
emergence of Nature. The product of the God-who-works escapes his
control (because it is superfluous for him). This fall is Nature, or God's
outside. In the creation, then, men unwittingly repress the essence of work.
But they do still more: they try to eliminate the very origins of work,
which, in its daily exercise, appears to them as a natural necessity (one
has to work in order to live, work is a natural law entailed by the Fall - as
appears in the myth of Eve: 'you will earn your bread by the sweat of your
brow).
'
7
This startlingly Catholic language finds Louis Althusser making the transition from the
Youth Movement to Marxism. The shift is marked in the analogies that Althusser creates
between the fall from Eden story of the Old Testament and humanity's alienation from
the products of their work. By marking God as a unity in himself, nature becomes the
alienated creation of a unified being. In the process of childbirth, of toiling in the soil to
117 Louis Althusser, The Spectre of Hegel: Early Writings, Trans. G.M. Goshgarian, (London: Verso, 1997),
168, n. 252.
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create crops and in any form of production, this process of alienation is repeated, though
Althusser claims that knowledge of its origins is constantly repressed. Is it then inherent
and natural that man and woman should always work? In the early Marx Althusser was
reading at the time of his thesis, the answer is no. Althusser explains this conundrum as a
misconception of work as necessary through the repression of its origin:
Moreover, work is inherently conditioned by nature, since the worker
transforms a nature that is given. In the creation myth, this natural
character of work disappears, because the Creator is not subject to any
law, and creates the world ex nihilo. In God the Creator, men not only
think the birth of nature, but attempt to overcome the natural character of
this birth by demonstrating that the creation has no origin (since God
creates without obligation or need); that the fall has no nature; and that
the very nature which seems to dominate work is, fundamentaly, only as
necessary as the (produced) nature which results from work... , 8
While it arrives in slightly different terms than we saw in Foucault, Althusser begins to
describe a doubling back of work upon itself. Negating its origins and perpetuating its
labor, a repression of the origins of creation and a glorification of production ex nihilo
denies the reality that work is a ceaseless and ultimately impossible process of
unalienating the creator and his creation.
"Developing and deepening this myth would perhaps enable us to
anticipate what Marx means by 'the identity of man and nature in work'.
Approached in this way, that identity would have two aspects. On the one
hand, men are identical with nature in that they are identical with what
they produce; their products become nature for them (this immediate
identity through labour re-emerges in revolutionary action; one may
therefore say that this alienation is already overcome in thought - men no
longer need a myth to represent it, since it has become the object of
economic science).
This new 'economic science' was, for the early Althusser and his mentor Gaston
Bachelard, the result of an epistemological rupture with practice-oriented systems of
118 Ibid.
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thought. In the Humanist Controversy, Althusser defines the 'economic science' of
revolutionary action as the theory which lags behind, and posthumously defines
revolution. In an attempt to resolve the dichotomies of theory and practice, Althusser
writes that it is the class struggle which is history, defined in the evolving space between
revolutionary action and its theorization which integrates product and producer. But this
space made way for a strong critique of Althusser's theorization, and:
By summer 1966, Althusser had admitted that his critics were right in one
crucial respect: the logic of the break isolated the theory required to make
the revolution from the realm of the non-theoretical practices in which the
revolution had (also) to be made. Theory became theory by virtue of a
distantiation that ruled out both its internal determination by ideology and
its direct intervention in ideology: a theory, by definition, had no practical
relation to the ideologicalpractices with which it broke. "9
To erase this loophole, Althusser pivoted, rejected the 'epistemological break' theory,
and sought to resolve the theory and practice dichotomy by more or less reducing theory
to practice. In doing so, Althusser is attempting to rescue historical materialism as a
science capable of producing absolute knowledge. 1 20 This shift is also illustrated in the
continuation of Althusser's exegesis of the Fall in Genesis and alienation in Marx, as he
unites man to, his work and makes them identical:
On the other hand, men would also be identical with the nature thatforces
them to work, and which they transform through work; this second identity
would be clarified through reflection of the first. Here, however, we would
have only an embryonic anticipation, for, in the obvious, elementary
sense, identity is still beyond men 's grasp. Men see clearly enough that the
natural world is given to them, and that they themselves exist because they
19 Goshgarian, G.M. The Humanist Controversy. ed. Matheron, F. and trans. Goshgarian, G.M. Verso:
New York, 2003. pp. xiii-xiv.
120 Ibid, p. xv.
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exercise a measure of control over it, thanks to their knowledge and
industry; 121
Here in Althusser's early work, a degree of control due to 'knowledge and
industry' is still possible, while a critical thesis of his later work will be the
negation of this possibility. Yet for the time being, Althusser takes a cautionary,
though humanist position which defers the completion of work to a future utopic
appearance:
However, they [men] have not completely overcome natural alienation:
they are subject to the elements, illness, and old age, and obliged to work
in order to live. Moreover, if the work of scientific knowledge and of the
transformation of the world is itself a recurrence of; and recovery from
[reprise], natural alienation, the recovery is not complete: circularity is
not re-established, and human circularity will no doubt be established
before natural circularity (in a socialist world, say the Marxists, one will
still have to overcome natural alienation). This deficiency explains why it
is still necessary to revert to myth in order to conceive a totality which has
not yet attained its concept; it is in the story of creation, on this view, that
men contemplate the reprise of natural alienation. ,122
On the subject of myth, Althusser may have retained its function for precisely or far more
than Marx had intended. Until 1965, Althusser was relatively unknown figure in French
philosophy. Yet in 1965, just after the death of Jacques Martin, Althusser launched a
radical dissent against the soft humanist interpretations of Karl Marx's writings which
had enveloped PCF discourse. The crux of Althusser's dissention is again another break,
but rather than an epistemological turn in history, this break and change appears, for
Althusser, between the early and late writings of Marx. Much like the shift between the
Old and New Testaments, Althusser marks out a break between a stage of Marxist
humanism of Hegelian origins and a radical theory of anti-humanist, nearly structuralist
121 Ibid.
122 Louis Althusser, The Spectre of Hegel: Early Writings, Trans. G.M. Goshgarian, (London: Verso, 1997),
168, n. 252.
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period of writings, (though Althusser would later defend Marx against structuralism,
delineating a difference between structuralism per se and structure as he found it in
Marx). From the so-called latter period of Marx writings, which began in 1845,
Althusser defines notions such as the conjuncture; a concept which effectively produces
history as a 'process without a subject'. Emphasizing this point, Althusser saw himself as
a mouthpiece, set in a particular time and place of history, blown through by an almost
holy wind that set his tongue in motion. In a speech made at the Ecole Normale,
Althusser stated:
... We will attend to the question of the author first. This play is a play
without an author. If we are here, it is as the effects of a theoretical
conjuncture. The person who is addressing you is, like all the rest of us,
merely a particular structural effect of this conjuncture, an effect that,
like each and every one of us, has a proper name. The theoretical
conjuncture that dominates us has produced an Althusserian-effect, as it
has produced a Rancibre effect, a Balibar effect, a Macherey-effect, and
Establet-effect, a Bettelheim-effect and so on... I am not joking when I say
that the play performed here is a play without an author, and that we are
all particular structural effects of the conjuncture. It is the philosophical
conjuncture which brings us together here, and provides our meeting with
its object. No one should be surprised if, in order to provide a precise
definition of the object of our meeting, I dwell on the conjuncture. Here,
too, I should like to try to say what naturally goes without saying, and lend
my voice to an analysis of the philosophical conjuncture that dominates
123US.
Althusser's persistent plays within his own sense of agency must have found a home in
this notion which echoes the New Testament prophets who were at once passive
receptors of the Holy Spirit and critical actors in the ushering in the Kingdom of God.
Yet, as we will see in the latter half of this chapter, the conjuncture is closely aligned to
Foucault's theory of 'subjectivation'. Yet while Foucault's work was a search after the
123 G.M.Goshgarian, The Humanist Controversy. pp. 16-17.
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'techniques of self making', Althusser set his task as that of reconciling the practice of
the PCF with his completion of the theory of Marxist theory:
This theoretical distinction made no practical difference. Althusserian
philosophy's task was the transformation of ideology; to transform
ideology, it had to reform the Party's understanding, translating
philosophy into politics by tutoring the modern Prince.12 4
Althusser carried out this tutoring in small group research and seminars before preaching
to the French Communist Party himself. Meanwhile, Althusser's students formed the
Cahiers Marxistes-ldninistes journal which helped publicize an anti-humanist
Althusserian brand of Marxism. As interest in the journal and Althusserianism escalated,
Althusser was certain that large groups would finally see the light of his elucidations.
The 'young lions' of the Ecole normale would now proceed, their
professor exulted, to make a 'practical application' of his principles. This
'direct translation from theory to politics' was 'wholly within the norms':
no arms were as powerful as those provided by 'a correct conception of
things ,.125
Yet what happens when a prophet fails to appear for his own baptism by fire? If we
consider that Althusser's Marxist interpretations were so closely figured on his Catholic
origins and theology, Althusser's disappearance in May 1968 left his sheep without a
shepherd. While Althusser did much to help unite the PCF and the Catholic Church in
France and it seems possible that he struggled until the end of his life with tensions
between Marxism and Catholicism. Like a rebellious, but dependent child, when push
came to shove, Althusser would retreat back into the shelter of the 'parent' group he felt
safe to criticize. Yet in both the Communist Party and the Catholic Church, Althusser's
critiques would never set foot outside the security of the collective. Before murdering his
124 Goshgarian, introduction to The Humanist Controversy, p. xxxii.
125 Ibid, xxxiii.
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wife, Helene, in 1980, he asked and was granted an audience with Pope John Paul II, but
before his greatest audience, Louis Althusser never arrived. 126 In May 1968, to the
disappointment of his students, Althusser adhered to the official PCF party line that what
was happening in the streets was not genuine revolution. Althusser later rescinded his
decision, writing that there was a real sense of action and change in May 1968, yet by this
time, his students had already lost faith in the Professor who spoke of revolution and
checked himself into a hospital the night before it might have arrived. Did Althusser's
work retain anything worth reading after he failed to join the upheaval he helped to
incite? Part of defining Althusser comes from the absence of work, of his work, and of
his presence in the following events.
Some place the start of May 1968 in Germany, 1966. In this year the Situationists
Internationale circulated inflammatory pamphlets which lead to a student revolt within
Strasburg University. 27 Others attribute primary responsibility to the increasingly
restrictive government of Charles De Gaulle in post-war France. Despite these
disagreements, with 12 million French workers on strike and student occupations of all
the major Universities inside France, most historians, sociologists and 68'ers have
claimed that for some moments in 1968, change was possible. Described as the
'revolution that never took place' May 1968 was pre- and pro-ceeded by extraordinary
events. An archived publication of Le Monde recounts and chronologizes those events:
126 "...Louis believed that the only way to save the world was by arranging a meeting between Moscow and
Rome - a reflection of the two extremes tearing at Althusser's mind. With Guitton's help, the Marxist
philosopher met one of Pope Jean-Paul's senior cardinals in Rome and then Guitton himself went to see the
Pope to ask him to talk to Althusser. The Pope's reply, according to Guitton, was 'I know your friend. He's a
logican who goes to the limit of his thoughts. I will receive him willingly.' That discussion never took
place. A month later, Louis Althusser strangled his companion of 35 years."
127 "On the Poverty of Student Life", a pamphlet published and distributed by the group Situationiste
Internationale.
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8. January - the Minister for Youth and Sports is forced by students to leave the
inauguration of a swimming pool at Nanterre.
26. January - There are violent exchanges during a demonstration by strikers at Caen.
7. February - An anti-Vietnam committee organizes a counter-demonstration against
supporters of US Vietnam policy, resulting in violent exchanges with
the police. A pro-North Vietnam demonstration takes place on 13
February.
14. February - Incidents at universities throughout France by students demanding
freedom of speech and movement.
22. February - The Minister of Education announces a limited liberalization of access
to universities.
19. March - A convention at Amiens attempts to sketch a design for educational
reforms.
22. March - At Nanterre University, the administrative tower is occupied by 150
students, who say they are anarchists. Courses are suspended until 1.
April.
12. April - The attack on student leader Rudi Dutschke in Germany results in riots
there and supporting demonstrations in France.
27. April - Daniel Cohn-Bendit, 23, student leader at the University of Nanterre, is
arrested.
2. May - Prime Minister Georges Pompidou leaves for official visits to Iran and
Afghanistan. Courses at the faculty of letters are suspended at Nanterre
after incidents there.
3. May - Police clear the courtyard at the Sorbonne. Violence in the Quartier
Latin results in more than 100 injured and 596 arrested.
By May 3rd, nearly every sector of French life and bureaucracy had been turned on its
head. As students occupied every major university office in France, even De Gaulle
feared a student occupation in his own office and fled to safety in the ranks of the army.
After seizing control of the Ecole De Beaux Arts, students painted the posters to give
symbolism to the seizures taking place in universities and factories across France. With
up to 12 million workers on strike, the month of May 1968 paralyzed the government of
France as De Gaulle tucked himself into seclusion; depending on the military to protect
him from an anticipated student take over.
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The language of the signage and the graffiti was clearly influenced by Marxism, though
most of the people on the street, the workers in occupied factories had never touched his
writings. What did touch the people, however was the response of the Communist Party,
or lack thereof, to the people on the streets that May. As the calendar moved forward,
hundreds were injured in police attacks and assaults:
4. May - Courses at the Sorbonne are suspended. The UNEF and the Snesup call
for unlimited strikes.
5. May - Courts convict 13 demonstrators; give four jail terms.
6. May - Battles in the Quartier Latin: 422 arrests; 345 police and about 600
students are hurt. Students at universities throughout France pledge
support.
7. May - At the tomb of the unknown soldier at Etoile: 30,000 students sing the
'Marseillaise.'
9. May - The Minister of Education forbids the re-opening of the faculties.
10. May - Night of riot in the Quartier Latin: police assault 60 barricades. 367 are
hospitalized of which 251 are police; 720 others hurt and 468 arrested.
Cars burned were 60 and 188 others were damaged. The Minister of
Education says of the protestors, "Ni doctrine, ni foi, ni loi."
11. May - The major unions, the CGT, the CFDT and the FEN, call for a general
strike on 13. May. Back in Paris, George Pompidou, announces the re-
opening of the Sorbonne, also for the 13. May.
13. May - The general strike puts hundreds of thousands of students and workers
in the streets of Paris; the Sorbonne is occupied by students.
14. May - The National Assembly discusses the university crises and the battles
of the Quartier Latin. President Charles de Gaulle leaves for Romania.
Workers occupy Sud-Aviation in Nantes.
15. May - The theatre de l'Od6on is occupied by 2,500 students and the Renault
factory at Cldon is occupied by workers.
16. Many - Strikes hit other factories throughout France, plus air transport, the
RATP and the SNCF. Newspapers fail to be distributed.
18. May - President de Gaulle arrives back from Romania, 12 hours earlier than
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expected. Cinema professionals occupy the Cannes Film Festival.
Major French directors withdraw their films from competition and the
jury resigns, closing the festival.
19. May - At the Elys6e palace, President de Gaulle says, "La r6forme, oui; la
chienlit, non"
20. May - An estimated 10 million workers are on strike; France is practically
paralysed.
22. May - A censure motion by opposition leftists falls 11 votes short of a
majority in the National Assembly. Union confederations say they are
willing the negotiate with the employer's association and the
government. An amnesty for demonstrators is passed by the Assembly.
A demonstration is held in Paris to protest the withdrawal of Daniel
Cohn-Bendit's residence permit for France.
As strikes continued throughout France, the French Communist Party made striking
decisions of another sort. When students at Nanterre University protested the arrest of 5
anti-Vietnam activists, the Communist Party dismissed the University take over. As
workers and students took to the streets, gaining control over countless factories and
universities, the PCF waited. Not until the 13th of May did the French Communist make
a statement in support of the strikes and barricade fighters, when it called a general strike
- something that had been afoot long before their proclamation. As the strikes continued,
the PCF feared for their positions of leadership. Workers and students called for their
own direct involvement in government representation, and as the PCF faltered, De Gaulle
took advantage of their fear. Realizing that the Communist Party alone would be able to
get people back to work, negotiations between employers and the Party began. The
offers, when brought to the factory works, were refused with laughter and jeering. The
Party had to act. And on May 2 5th, hiding behind the rhetoric of victory through higher
wages, the PCF issued their first communique:
As was confessed by General de Gaulle himself, the current government
has been very much weakened.. Millions of blue- and white-collar
workers are on strike; the aspiration of an entire people for a true regime
change continues to grow. Negotiations with union organizations are
going to begin, but what millions of strikers and their families are waiting
for is the rapid satisfaction of their essential demands... This is why the
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French Communist Party, considering it necessary that a step be taken
towards socialism, proposes not only the nationalization of the big banks,
but also that of the great industrial enterprises that are part of the
monopolies that dominate the key sectors of the economy... I stress that
the Communists aren 't proposing reforms in order to bury - under Left-
wing phrases - essential demands of the workers, such as a general
increase in wages, the progressive reduction of the work day, the
abrogation of anti-social ordinances, andfull employment for all.
Contrary to the assertions of certain Leftists affiliated with anarchism,
these demands have not been superseded; they must be satisfied without
delay... May 24, 1968128
The first of three May communiques, the Party's fear and readiness to negotiate was
wholly unacceptable to the people fighting for change. Yet the PCF played a critical role
in returning France to the status quo, and thereby ensuring the Communist's and the
Left's political defeat.
24. May - President de Gaulle announces a referendum on radio and television.
Overnight rioting in Paris sees 795 arrests, and 456 injured. An attempt
to torch the Bourse is made. Other incidents throughout France; a
Commissaire de Police is killed in Lyon by a truck. Committees for the
Defense of the Republic - CDR - are launched.
25. May - France's state radio and television - the ORTF - goes on strike: no TV-
news at 20:00. Prime Minister Georges Pompidou negotiates with
everybody.
27. May - Agreement is reached between the unions, employer's associations and
the government. Minimum wage is to be raised, working hours cut,
reduction in the age of retirement, and the right to organize. Workers at
Renault and other big firms refuse to return to work. At 17:00, 30,000
students and workers march from Gobelins to the Charl6ty stadium,
where they hold a meeting, which Pierre Mend6s-France attends.
28. May - Georges Pompidou accepts the resignation of the Minister of
Education.
29. May - President de Gaulle cancels weekly ministerial meeting and arrives at
Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises at 18:00, after making secret visit to
General Massu, who leads French troops stationed in Baden-
Wurttemberg. A demonstration called for by the CGT brings out
several hundreds of thousands in Paris.
30. May - By radio, President de Gaulle announces the dissolution of the National
128 For the full communique, see Appendix 2: "Declaration by PCF Secretary General Waldeck-Rochet"
L 'Humanite, May 25, 1968. Trans. Mitch Abidor.
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Assembly and says the elections will take place within the normal
timetable. Georges Pompidou remain Prime Minister. An allusion is
made that force will be used to maintain order, if necessary. Tens of
thousands of government supporters march from Concorde to the
Etoile.
31. May- The cabinet is reshuffled and elections are announced for the 23. and
30. June. Exchange controls are re-established and demonstrations of support for
the government are held throughout France.
1. June - The Pentecost long weekend is welcomed with the return of fuel to gas
stations and truly huge taffic jams throughout Paris and France. The
minimum wage is raised to three francs an hour.
By Tuesday, June 1 st, under PCF negotiations clemencies were granted to most of the
strikers, who left their points of protest behind and headed back to work. That same day
President de Gaulle confessed that he had considered resignation on May 29 th. By June
10 th, though election campaigns had begun, even as the violence persisted.
The course of elections was a devastating blow to the people fighting on the streets in
May 68'. First, the communists and leftists as a whole lost 100 seats and ample ground
while the right won full majority. When Georges Pompidou resigned on July 10 th, his
replacement stated that by the end of the year 'grand rdformes' would begin to take place.
As journalists were fired for participating in the May events and 'austerity measures'
were installed by the National Assembly, the promised 'r6formes' looked increasingly
more ominous. And by April of 1969:
An extraordinary election was held in France.... President de
Gaulle asked voters to decide whether he was to continue as
President of France. On 27. April, 10,901,753 voted 'oui,' and
12,007,102 voted 'non.' At his residence in Colombey-le-Deux-
Eglises on 28. April 1969, he said, "e cesse d'exercer mes
fonctions de president de la Ripublique. Cette decision prend effet
aujourd'hui t midi. ,,129
129 Le Monde "Dossiers & Documents", number 264.
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On June 16th, 1969, Georges Pompidou was elected president. Despite all that had
happened, the right and their grand reforms re-ascended. The events had come full circle.
But again, where was Althusser? By the time he checked himself out of the hospital,
long after the revolution that never occurred, he had lost standing with his students and,
ironically, within the Communist Party itself. Though American papers and obitiuaries
of Althusser remember him as one of the strongest denouncers of the French Communist
Party, such construals of Althusser's outbursts are misunderstood. From within the walls
of the Party, as within the walls of the Church and the Ecole Normale, Althusser had
always played the gadfly. Yet when the rebel returned home to the party line in May
1968, his prior critiques were written off as petty outbursts. Althusser's inaction silenced
himself, and helped, albeit inadvertently, with the gradual decline and silencing of the
PCF itself. In the years that followed, Althusser contributed minor articles on Marx
which were largely ignored. What finally brought him back into the limelight ended both
his career as a professor and scholar and the life of Hl6ne Lgotien.
For Althusser, despite his rebellions, there had always been the Catholic Church, there
had always been the tcole Normale and the Communist Party, and there was always been
Hel1ne. Until, as Althusser describes:
...on this occasion I was massaging the front of her neck. I pressed my
thumbs into the hollow at the top of her breastbone and then, still
pressing, slowly moved them both, one to the left, the other to the
right...The muscles in my forearms began to feel very tired... Helene's
face was calm and motionless, her eyes were open and staring at the
ceiling. Suddenly, I was terror struck. Her eyes stared interminably, and
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I noticed the tip of her tongue was showing between her teeth and lips,
strange and still... 130
At this point, Althusser ran from his apartment to the house of his long-term friend and
doctor, Dr. tienne of the Ecole. Yelling from #6 Rue d'Ulm to Dr. Etienne's flat, "I've
strangled Helene," Althusser soon found himself at Sainte-Anne's Hospital after a quick,
unanticipated shot of sedative from Dr. Etienne. Under the doctor's diagnosis he was
diagnosed with mental instability, rendering him unsuitable to stand trial or
imprisonment. He was sent, instead, to a mental hospital for treatment.
And in Helene's death, again, where was Althusser? As his autobiography describes his
wife's death his person, his agency, is somehow eerily absent. Countless reasons for this
strangulation have been mounted, and such a story can never be clear. But was this
Althusser's first attempt to break out of the invisibility he had built around himself? Did
he hate her for keeping him inside, or did he truly lose his mind and kill someone he
loved dearly. Ironically and disturbingly, even at the point of Helene's death Althusser is
identifying with someone outside himself, as he recalls:
The long, worn-out curtains hung in tatters on each side of the window - the one
on the right brushing against the bottom of the bed. I recalled seeing our friend
Jacques Martin in his tiny bedroom in the Sixteenth District. He was found dead
one day in August 1964 and had been stretched out on his bedfor several days.
On his chest lay the long stem of a scarlet rose. It was a silent message from
beyond the grave to the two of us who had been his friends for twenty years, a
reminder of Beloyannis. At that moment I took a ribbon of curtain and without
tearing it placed it diagonally across Helene's chest, from her right shoulder to
her left breast. 13'
130 Althusser, Louis. The Future Lasts Forever, pp. 15-16.
131 Althusser, Louis. The Future Lasts Forever, p. 16.
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It was the end of her life, the end of Althusser's career, but once again the Ecole had
pulled him into its fold as Dr. Etienne saved him from public trial and humiliation. Even
his autobiographies carry on in the style of rebellion he knew so well, as Althusser
clambered, years later for recognition of the sanity Dr. Etienne and others denied in order
to save him.
Now, almost 40 years past May 1968, and 25 years after he strangled Helene, Althusser
has again found an audience. Yet, as one reviewer points out in what follows, Althusser's
tendency to review and revise his own ideas years afterward have enable unorthodox
interpretations of all kinds to emerge from his writings. Althusser's own question, "Who
am I?" again leads us to a multiplicity of personages who may or may not be humanist,
anti-humanist, Catholic, Marxist, scientific or founded.
The publication of The Humanist Controversy and Other Writings adds
another installment to the posthumous reckoning with Louis Althusser that
began after the theorist died on October 22, 1990... However, the labour
of treatment developed quickly into a project directed towards the
revitalization of the Althusserian legacy tout court: a reinterpretation,
under the sign of the posthumous bracketed "s" for Althusser(s)-
Hegelian, Spinozist, Leninist, Lacanian, Machiavellian and aleatory
Marxist... What these ten years of academic labour demonstrate is that we
should have no illusion as to the topicality of this collection... Instead, we
might focus on the discernable outline of a certain tactical plan in
development: first, produce a body of commentary that contextually
reorients the theorist towards more palatable figures such as Jacques
Lacan, Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, and Guy Debord, etc; second,
use the publication of "new" archival texts from the 1950s and 1980s as a
means to disturb the "canon" upon which the dominant monolithic anti-
structural and anti-Althusserian view rests. A third element now comes
into play. In order for a new reading to really take wing, the project will
have to move beyond the exercise of displacement and ensure that the
"old" Althusser is exorcised completely... 132
132 Julian Holland. 'Pour Althusser(s): Review of Louis Althusser, The Humanist Controversy and Other
Writings, ed. Francois Matheron, trans. G.M. Goshgarian (Verso, 2003).
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The "old" Althusser? This sort of critique, while valid and tempting, relies on the reality
of a point in history when the 'real' Althusser was known and made himself known. But
as we have seen from countless efforts from Althusser himself, 'Where is Althusser?'
'Who is Althusser?': these questions of identity persist through myriad of collective
enterprises that embrace and protect the multiplicity of men who lived by the name of
Louis Althusser.
But why the recent rush to associate Althusser with Foucault? In reality it was Althusser
who taught Foucault at the Ecole Normale, and Althusser who lead Foucault to join the
Communist Party in 1950133. But of course it was Foucault, who, two years later left the
PCF:
When I left the PCF, it was after the famous plot by Stalin's doctors in the
winter of 1952, and it came about because of a persistent feeling of
uneasiness. Shortly before Stalin 's death the news was spread that a group
of doctors had made an attempt on his life....Even though we were not
convinced, we all tried our hardest to believe what we had been told. This
too was part of what I would describe as a disastrous attitude, but one I
shared That was my way of being in the party. Being obliged to stand
behind a fact that was the total opposite of credible was part of that
exercise of "ego dissolution," part of the search for some way to be
"other." ... Three months after Stalin's death, however, we learned that the
133 On the friendship of Foucault and Althusser, David Macey writes: Foucault andAlthusser became close
friends in the late 1940 's and the former profited greatlyfrom the older man 's counsels. It was on
Althusser's advice that Foucault rejected hospitalization as a solution to his depressive problems, and his
early career was to be heavily influence by 'oldAlt', as he was affectionately known at ENS. The very real
friendship that developed was to be proof against all political differences and disagreements and was to
survive bitter personal tragedies too. It was also proof against the sarcasm Althusser often directed
against those around him. Not all Althusser's comments on Foucault were charitable. When he learned
that Foucault was studying madness and was spending time at the Sainte-Anne psychiatric hospital, he
remarked in the presence of the young English historian Douglas Johnson, who spent the years 1947-1949
at ENS, that he should be kept there... p. 25. Macey also writes: Althusser and Foucault had a mutual
friend in Jacques Martin, ' a distressed homosexual, but a warm man despite the distance of his latent
schizophrenia... Michel Foucault loved him as much as I did. 'p.2 5 .
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doctors' plot had been sheer invention. What happened? ... We never had
an answer. You will say that it was something they did all the time,
nothing out of the ordinary. ... The fact is that from that moment I moved
away from the PCF.13 4
At the same time, the PCF issued a statement that 'homosexuality was a bourgeois vice
and sign of decadence.' While the government itself had issues similar edicts, is there
something appealing about Foucault's unwillingness to stay within a party that was
unknowingly judging him carte blanche?
Somehow, more than the recent 'coolness' of Foucault's resistance, it may shared
intellectual influences which encourages historians to align Althusser with his legacy.
Edward Said writes:
Foucault emerged out of a strange revolutionary concatenation of
Parisian aesthetic and political currents which for about thirty years
produced such a concentration of brilliant work as we are not likely to see
again for generations. In what amounted to a genuine upheaval in modern
thought, the barriers between disciplines and indeed languages were
broken, then the fields separated by these barriers were reshaped from
beneath the surface to their most complex superstructures. 135
While Foucault played a crucial role in breaking the barriers between disciplines, his
mentorship under figures like Gaston Bachelard and Jean Hyppolite was common to
Althusser as well. Said continues:
Theory, images of astonishing fecundity, and vast formal systems--to say
nothing of idioms that seemed barbarous at first but soon became
fashionable--poured out from these figures, whose ancestry was a
contradictory amalgam of the academic and the insurrectionary. All
seemed to have been deeply affected by Marx and individually to a greater
or lesser degree by Freud; most were rhetorical tacticians and obsessed
by language as a way of seeing, if not actually constituting, reality; many
134 Trombadori, Colloqui, 33; Eribon, 56.)
135 'La situation de Cuvier dans 'histoire de la biologie', paper read to the 'Joumrnes Cuvier' conference
held on 30-31 May 1969.
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were influenced by university courses and almost legendary teachers--the
names of Gaston Bachelard, Georges Dumdzil, Emile Benveniste, Jean
Hyppolite, and Alexandre Kojbve...recur with frequency--as much as they
were influenced by surrealist poets and novelists like Andre Brdton and
Raymond Roussel, as well as by the maverick writer-philosophers Georges
Bataille and Maurice Blanchot. 13 6
Through one of the primary voices of Henri-IV, (Foucault and Martin's equivalent of
'high school'), Jean Hyppolite would introduce the young scholars to their first readings
of Hegel. Though Martin was four years older than Foucault, both students passed
through Hyppolite's instruction, and later, Jacques Martin would translate Hegel for
Althusser.
The importance of Hegel for the generation that attended ENS in the
immediate aftermath of the war can be gauged by the titles of the DEA
dissertations written by three normaliens between 1947 and 1949: Louis
Althusser, La Notion de contenu dans la philosophie de G.W.F. Hegel;
Jacques Martin, La Notion d'individu chez Hegel; Michel Foucault, La
constitution d'un transcendental dans 'la Phenomdnologie de l'esprit' de
Hegel. 137
The road to Marx was most direct for Jacques Martin, who passed him on to Althusser,
who passed him on to Foucault. Marx opened the door to German philosophy for all
three normaliens. Yet:
...all of these Parisian intellectuals were deeply rooted in the political
actualities of French life, the great milestones of which were World War
II, the response to European communism, the Vietnamese and Algerian
colonial wars, May 1968. Beyond France it was Germany and German
thought that mattered most, rarely the work of British or American
writers. 138
As the above PCF membership example suggests, Foucault's own political response
differed wildly from Althusser's. While both were absent from the May 1968 events,
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Foucault was in Tunisia, fighting different, but no less politically significant battles.
Foucault described the events of 1967-68 uprisings in Tunisia as follows:
A goodfifty fires. 150-200 shops looted - the poorest ones, obviously; the
timeless spectacle of the synagogue gutted, carpets dragged into the street,
trampled on and burned; people running through the streets, taking refuge
in a block that the mob wanted to set on fire. Since the, silence, the
shutters down, no one or almost no one in the area, children playing with
broken knick knacks... Nationalism plus racism adds up to something very
nasty. And if you add that, because of the gauchisme, the students lent a
hand (and a bit more than a hand) to it all, you feel quite profoundly sad.
And one wonders by what strange ruse or (stupidity) of history, Marxism
could give rise to that (and supply a vocabularyfor it).'39
As the anti-Semitic current rose in Tunisia, Foucault stepped back into political action.
Lending print machinery for the production of anti-government fliers coincided with a
heightened presence of unconvincing and surveillance savvy homeless constantly outside
Foucault's home and doorway. The final warning came when Foucault's car was stopped
and Foucault was subjected to a "savage beating" 14 0. He persisted in supporting students
who underwent trials and persecutions in the Tunisian courts and quickly became a nail
in the foot of the Tunisian government. In light of his involvement and experiences,
Foucault saw the events of May 1968 in Paris with fascination and skepticism, stating:
There is no comparison between the barricades of the Latin Quarter and
the real risk of doingfifteen years in prison, in Tunisia. 141
Yet, when Foucault was in Paris on May 17t h 1968, he joined with 50,000 others to support
both workers and students' rights.
139 'La situation de Cuvier dans l'histoire de la biologie', paper read to the 'Joumrnes Cuvier' conference
held on 30-31 May 1969.
140 Macey, p 205.
141 Macey, pp. 205-206.
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Foucault's political activity inspired many to re-read La Histoire de la Folie as a tool of
revolution within staid institutions. Foucault didn't deny these readings and over the
course of his life, he continued to sign petitions, to march, to make formal and written
statements in the press and to the state on the behalf of a wide array of persons suffering
from 'injustice'. He didn't pick a cause, or an organization, nor did he always take up the
cases directly pertaining to his last political action. His variable moves and choices make
it difficult to tell the story of 'Foucault, opponent of the X' or 'Foucault, defender of the
Y or Z'. This inherent resistance may have something to do with Foucault's own
definitions of subject and statement making.
Foucault's concern in statement making is with the process of discourse formation, not
object naming. Accordingly, David Macey points out that, for Foucault, a statement is:
A function of existence which belongs specifically to signs and on the basis
of which one can decide, through analysis or intuition, if they 'make
sense' or not, according to the order in which they follow one another or
are juxtaposed, of what they are the sign and what kind of act is effected
by theirformulation (oral or written). 142
And further:
To describe a formulation as a statement does not consist in analyzing
relations between the author and what he says... but of determining the
position any individual can and must occupy in order to be its subject. 4 3
Like Derrida, another figure at the Ecole Normale during Althusser, Foucault and
Martin's studies, Foucault's work is one of decentering the subject in time, in history. To
do this, Foucault's archeology is a study of the historical discourses that make subject
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142 Macey, David. p 202.
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making, or subjectivation possible. Foucault's subject is a product of history, not a
limited or autonomous figure. In this construction alone, as we saw in Chapter 3,
Foucault is challenging Kant and the Modernist conception of genius.
What results is a nearness to Althusser in his description not only of ideology, but also of
the conjuncture. While we earlier described the conjuncture as a concept which
effectively views history as a 'process without a subject', Althusser's passivity is not
altogether present in Foucault's process of subjectivation:
A process of subjectivation, that is, a production of a mode of existence,
cannot be confused with a subject, unless it is to discharge the latter from
all interiority and even from all identity. Subjectivation does not even
have anything to do with a 'person': it is an individuation, specific or
collective, that characterizes an event (a time of day, a river, a wind, a
life...) It is an intensive mode and not a personal subject. 144
The anti-humanism of this passage and countless others like it in both Althusser and
Foucault's writing may be related to each scholars' choice of reading material. As
Althusser and Foucault turned to Germany for their literature, Heidegger and Nietzsche's
influences are clear. And with them, is the pervading shadow of the Catholic Church.
Catholic theology has generally and traditionally taken an anti-humanist viewpoint by
defaulting to the omnipotence of the godhead. Yet the term anti-humanist is most closely
related to the work of Martin Heidegger, who was, in no small way, influenced by his
early Catholic theological training. Yet, while Heidegger's work is not strictly Catholic,
144 This quote originated in the writing of Gilles Deleuze, "La vie comme oeurvre d'art" in Pourparlers,
138 pp 100-101, but is discussed in an insightful writing by Eleanor Kaufmnan entitled "Madness and
Repetition" in The Delirium of Praise, p 70.
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it is anti-humanist and this influence procured strange 2 0 th century philosophical progeny
for the Weimar Scholar and Nazi sympathizer.
Since World War II, literary theory, especially among German-influenced
French thinkers and their American disciples, has moved rapidly from one
"antihumanist" fad to another, from structuralism to semiotics to
hermeneutics to poststructuralism and deconstruction. Among the leading
tenets of thefinal product are: "the dissolution of the self"; the claim that
the individual is a 'fiction", or that the individual is the creation of
bourgeois ideology, or that the "subject" must be deconstructed; the
denial of transcendence (or of the transcendent subject); and the belief,
derivedfrom Nietzsche andfiltered through Heidegger, that there are no
facts, only interpretation.14 5.
Many Heideggerian historians and scholars make a tie between Heidegger's anti-
humanism and his ability to live through, support and participate in radical human
atrocities. The origins of not only Catholic, but religious theologies worldwide are often
oriented toward resolving a brutally inhumane world with inner constructions of justice,
freedom and happiness; most do so, ultimately by again, defaulting to the omnipotence of
a godhead whose reasoning is beyond human capacity.
Looming behind this antihumanist viewpoint is.. Nazism and the
Holocaust. Auschwitz provides the historical context for understanding
recent literary criticism; [The author] suggests substituting the
"historically rooted term, post-Auschwitz'" for the "vague and
misleading category, postmodern. "' He apparently has several things in
mind when he speaks of our intellectual landscape as "post-Auschwitz".
First, Auschwitz "is the symbol of the total collapse of a high culture" (p.
85), a collapse that literature, science, and art could do nothing to
prevent. 4 Second, [the author] has detected "certain affinities to
totalitarian ways of thinking" in postmodern theory; Auschwitz stands as a
horrible reminder that bad ideas have bad consequences. Auschwitz
exercises a more direct influence as well. The ever-shifting edifice of
Postwar theory has been constructed by thinkers who either actively
collaborated with the Nazis (Heidegger and Paul de Man) or remained
indifferent to atrocity. The theories they formulated in the aftermath of the
war... (with specific reference to Paul de Man), are "a useful device for
145 Ott, Hugo. Martin Heidegger: A Political Life, trans. Allan Blunden; New York: Basic, 1993. p. 1 7
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creating an intricate and elaborate set of evasions that would help him
nulli2f his own guilt-ridden past." It is certainly convenient for anyone
who has committed gross transgressions to argue that 'value' is a fiction
designed to legitimate middle-class oppression of the lower classes.
This review, while conservative in its review of postmodernism, hits a nerve that readers
of Althusser cannot help but notice. For Althusser, anti-humanism was directly equated
to the futility, of human action. Did Althusser erase his own impotent agency in a larger
omnipotence, such as the will of God in his early work, or the shiftings of the class
struggle and the conjuncture, as in his Marxist writings?146 But what of Foucault?
Silently and strongly influenced by Heidegger, Foucault did his last writings in the library
of a Catholic cloister. These writings made up a four volume consideration of the
Catholic influences of morality and norms on the nature of sexuality and subjectivation in
the 17th to the 2 0 th centuries. Yet it is not accurate to elide Foucault and Althusser's
Catholic influences and receptions: while Althusser deferred to safety under umbrellas of
Church, Helene and the Communist Party, Foucault played on the border of an historical
determinism that still allowed for individual political action.
In the larger context of 2 0 th century France however, is it safe to conclude then, as the
reviewer above does, that what is missing between Althusser and Foucault's anti-
humanisms and the existentialism of Sartre may be, for example, the Protestant
revolution? Relying on the commanding discourses or ideologies of history, Foucault
and Althusser's theorizations of subjectivation and even the conjuncture differ greatly
from the sense of self and individuality that Martin Luther's theses, nailed to the door of
146 Jean Guitton claims that Althusser was considering a life of the cloth before he met his future wife, and
Marxism through her. See Webster, Paul.
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the Catholic Church, unwittingly evinced. Yet, for both Catholics and Protestants, the
question returns to one of work, within the context of salvation, within the context of
ethics, and in the nature of creation - as discussed above. And perhaps, rather than
reading the Protestant split onto the ideas of Foucault, Althusser and Martin, the more
interesting question, ultimately is still this question of work.
To conclude then, if work is, a la Kant, Althusserian Marxism and Catholicism, the
action by which one draws oneself nearer to understanding reality by attempting to
dissolve alienation, work is also a necessary, constant, yet ultimately futile attempt at an
impossible metaphysical union. Foucault's absence of work, is then, both a recognition
of the futility of 'work' and a recognition of the absence which occurs when metaphysics
is no longer the frame for rationality or ethics. In May 1968, in the Communist Party, in
the French schools and government this absence of work marked the speeches of the
PCF, it shadowed the student revolt and hovered in Althusser's hospital cell as he waited
until the student's logic doubled back and became the right wing escalation of power.
The realty and Foucault's metaphor of Jacques Martin's suicide and schizophrenic self
erasure occurs again and again until it too is erased in a fold of logic on logic that
contradicts itself to no end. Is Jacques Martin's death and his self erasure then simply a
disturbing story of one more painful suicide? Yes, but is it also an absence that marked
Foucault and Althusser in its breakdown? My hope, at the end of this thesis, is that these
answers are more complicated than they first appeared.
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APPENDIX B
PCF Statements, May 1968
Declaration by PCF Secretary General Waldeck-Rochet
L'Humanit, Trans. Abidor, Mitch, May 25, 1968.
As was confessed by General de Gaulle himself, the current government has been very
much weakened. And a referendum will not resolve its problems. The government is
condemned to come to an early end.
Millions of blue- and white-collar workers are on strike; the aspiration of an entire
people for a true regime change continues to grow. Negotiations with union
organizations are going to begin, but what millions of strikers and their families are
waiting for is the rapid satisfaction of their essential demands.
On the political level, the question ofpower is posed more than ever. The Gaullist regime
has reached its end. It must depart.
In order to answer the aspirations of workers, teachers, and students, the state must end
its subjugation by the monopoly capitalists, something that requires profound structural
reforms. This is why the French Communist Party, considering it necessary that a step be
taken towards socialism, proposes not only the nationalization of the big banks, but also
that of the great industrial enterprises that are part of the monopolies that dominate the
key sectors of the economy.
In addition, we call for the democratic management of national enterprises, and the
establishment - at all levels of economic life - of a controlling power by workers,
beginning with the extension of the powers of enterprise committees, and the unhindered
activity of union branches in the enterprises.
I stress that the Communists aren't proposing reforms in order to bury - under Left-
wing phrases - essential demands of the workers, such as a general increase in wages,
the progressive reduction of the work day, the abrogation of anti-social ordinances, and
full employment for all.
Contrary to the assertions of certain Leftists affiliated with anarchism, these demands
have not been superseded; they must be satisfied without delay.
In order to completely change policies, and to realize real structural reforms, we must
have done with the power of the monopolies, with Gaullist power, and promote a popular
government that relies on the will of the people.
The Communist Party, which is ready to take its place in such a government, has never
ceased proposing to other parties of the Left, as well as democratic organizations, an
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agreement on the basis of a common program of government. It's not our fault if this
agreement has not yet been reached.
It's in order that this objective be quickly reached that the Communist Party invites the
creation of numerous action committees for a popular government and for democratic
unity. May 24, 1968
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Unity in Struggle
Waldeck Rochet, L'Humanit, trans. Abidor, Mitch May 31, 1968.
Dear Friends and Comrades:
Our country is currently living through events of considerable importance. A movement
of exceptional breadth and strength is stirring up all the working strata of the nation.
While profits grow, the workers have seen their standard of living stagnate or even get
worse. Price increases, increases in taxes and rents, the dismantling of Social Security,
500, 000 unemployed these are the fruits of the anti-social policies of Gaullist power.
An out of date educational system, wildly insufficient social and cultural equipment, tens
of thousands of young people - workers and students - without jobs: this is what
Gaullist power has given French youth.
A unanimous cry today resounds through the factories, the offices, and the universities:
"Ten years are enough!" (Applause). Nine million workers have gone on strike in order
to demand that their most urgent demands finally be met. They callfor a general increase
in salaries, the guarantee of employment and resources, the reduction of the work day
without a decrease in salary, the abrogation of ordinances, the defense of Social Security,
the moving up of the retirement age, the rebirth and the extension of union rights in the
enterprise.
At the same time, students and teachers are engaged in a greatfightfor a democratic and
modem reform of the educational system. They want a new university; its structures,
content, and methods adapted to modern methods and the needs of the country.
The working class - only 10% of whose children have access to the universities - are in
entire solidarity with this just demand of the students. The peasants, too, are manifesting
their discontent. They demand the ability to sell their products at remunerative prices,
and the abandonment of an agricultural policy that deliberately exposes them to the
blows of competition from big landowners and private banks.
The French Communist Party, which, from the beginning, has denounced the
malfeasance of the Gaullist regime, supports the demands of the workers, the students
and the peasants without reserve. These demands, farfrom being outdated, are just.
They must be satisfied.
The strength and the cohesion of the strike movement are such that state power and the
bosses have been forced to enter into negotiations and make certain concessions.
Workers, employees, and civil servants have said they will return to work once they feel
that, in the current state of their struggle, the negotiations currently under way will give
them satisfaction.
We Communists fully support their determination to finally see their legitimate demands
met. We say to them: your resolution is all the more justified in that big capital's regime
is in trouble. It has continuously grown weaker over the lastfew years under the repeated
blows delivered by worker and democratic struggles, struggles in which the Communists
have played a determining role.
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Today this power shows itself incapable of resolving the pressing problems that the
workers, students and peasants pose: all the social strata that are victims of the
monopolies that have literally squeezed them for the past ten years. It's been ten years
that Gaullist management has done everything possible to liquidate all forms of
democracy in France, to prevent the French from having their say in the managing of the
affairs of the country, which is to say their own affairs. And this is why the question that
is posed today is that of Gaullist power itself. Incapable of resolving the problems that
are posed, General de Gaulle - in his last speech - in a way declared war on the
workers who are on strike for their demands; on the students and teachers in struggle for
a democratic university; on the millions of Frenchmen who want political change.
Here is the essence of the declaration adopted by the Political Bureau of the Communist
Party immediately after General de Gaulle's speech:
"In order to oppose the workers, de Gaulle has violently gone after the Communist Party,
which has always defended the interests of the working class, interests inseparable from
those of the nation. The attack against our Party tries to mask the General's will to
impose his own dictatorship. "
The truth is that the working class and its organizations have demonstrated amazing
calm; they've expanded their protest movement and mass political struggle while taking
care to reject any kind ofprovocation. This is true in thefactories occupied by millions of
strikers, as well as in the impressive street demonstrations organized by the CGT, the
other unions, and the Communist Party.
Showing his contempt for blue and white-collar workers, the chief of state hasn 't thought
it worth his awhile to say the least word concerning their demands. But the first condition
to be met in order to settle the immense conflict provoked by the harmful policies of a
power in service to the trusts, is to meet the legitimate and unanimous union demands.
It's also that of the French Communist Party.
De Gaulle has announced his intention to proceed to new elections.
The French Communist Party did not wait for this speech to demand that the people be
permitted their say as soon as possible. Our Party will go to this vote stating its program
of social progress and peace, as well as its policy of union of all democratic forces. It
immediately calls on the millions of Frenchmen and women to have confidence in it, to
push back Gaullist power, and to install a true democracy that will be in the service of
the interests of the workers. It calls on the workers, on all democratic forces to
strengthen and extend their union, in the interests of the people and of France. Despite
the threats in de Gaulle's speech, the workers will not allow themselves to be intimidated.
May 31, 1968
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Communique of the CGT
1'HumanitW, trans., Abidor, Mitch, June 7, 1968. p.1
The millions of workers of the public and nationalized sectors, as well as of diverse
industries in the private sector whose demands have been met, have returned to work
strengthened by a remarkable victory. The National Bureau salutes the unity, the
combativeness, and the great maturity of the workers who have thus concluded an
essential phase of their battle under the best conditions, opening up great prospects for
even wider democratic conquests.
The only workers remaining on strike are those who have come up against particularly
retrograde bosses, who persist in their refusal to grant what has elsewhere been
obtained.
The National Bureau of the CGT firmly declares that the settling of demands in
metallurgy, construction, rubber, and a certain number of enterprises in other branches
of industry in the same spirit as that which occurred in other large sectors of the
economy, is an affair that involves the responsibility of the government and the CNPF f 
The most reactionary elements among the bosses are forcing the continuation of the
strikes in these sectors and act as veritable provocateurs. In denouncing them as such,
the National Bureau of the CGT insists on pointing out the grave responsibilities of the
government, which acts as their protector.
The threatening declarations of the Minister of Information, the various attempts to break
a justified strike, the recourse to the hired strong-arm men of the so-called "civic action
committees " of M Frey, police intervention against strikers, all of this situates this as a
government of the most sordid bosses, of which Citroen and Michelin, among others, are
the symbol.
Its conduct at Renault, a nationalized enterprise under its responsibility, and most
notably the brutal police intervention at Flins, is a demonstration of this, and indicates
an unacceptable desire for vengeance against those who gave the signal to set in motion
the general strike. That which the government did not dare to do against the workers of
the large nationalized industries and the civil servants, the working class and public
opinion will not tolerate that they be done against the steel- and other workers, who ask
for nothing but that which has been obtained by all the others.
The National Bureau salutes the workers of the arsenals, the gas workers and the
electrical workers who, at the appeal of their CGTfederations, are contributing a day of
their salaries for their comrades forced to pursue their strikes. It calls on the all the
workers who have victoriously returned to work to take inspiration from these examples,
and to immediately demonstrate the most active material and moral solidarity.
It calls on all of public opinion, which has had the occasion to appreciate the spirit of
responsibility of the CGT and the calm of the millions of workers in struggle, in order
that it bring its powerful support to those who are victims of a scandalous injustice and of
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discrimination. The recalcitrant bosses must be forced to seriously and quickly negotiate
in order to satisfy, as was done for the others, the legitimate demands of their employees.
1. Conseil National du Patronat Franqais - national employer's association.
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